{"id":60884,"date":"2025-08-28T14:29:40","date_gmt":"2025-08-28T05:29:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/apinitiative.org\/?p=60884"},"modified":"2025-08-28T14:29:40","modified_gmt":"2025-08-28T05:29:40","slug":"distrust-toward-the-u-s-mixed-feelings-about-south-korea-and-heightened-concern-over-a-taiwan-crisis-interim-findings-of-joint-survey-released-to-mark-60-years-since-japan-south-korea-nor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/apinitiative.org\/en\/2025\/08\/28\/60884\/","title":{"rendered":"Distrust Toward the U.S., Mixed Feelings About South Korea, and Heightened Concern Over a Taiwan Crisis – Interim Findings of Joint Survey Released to Mark 60 Years Since Japan\u2013South Korea Normalization"},"content":{"rendered":"

The International House of Japan (Minato-ku, Tokyo; Chairman: James Kondo) \u2013 Asia Pacific Initiative (API), in partnership with the East Asia Institute (EAI) of South Korea and the Korea Economic Institute (KEI) in the United States, has conducted the First Japan\u2013U.S.\u2013Korea Public Perception Survey (hereinafter \u201cthe survey\u201d).<\/p>\n

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, an important milestone for reflecting on the current state and future of bilateral ties. Attention is also focused on the Trump administration\u2019s approach to Japan and South Korea, two key allies in Asia.<\/p>\n

The survey was designed to analyze mutual perceptions and attitudes toward key issues among citizens of the three countries, which together form the foundation of increasingly vital trilateral cooperation. It also aims to shed light on public opinion in Japan and South Korea and provide insights for policymakers.<\/p>\n

Preliminary findings indicate that while the United States is positioned as an \u201cextremely important ally,\u201d approximately 45% of respondents believe Japan\u2013U.S. relations will \u201cdeteriorate,\u201d citing distrust of President Trump (70% hold a negative impression) and opposition to tariff policies. Regarding South Korea, although negative impressions predominate due to historical issues, popular culture such as K-POP and K-dramas contributed to some improvement in its image, and more than half of respondents considered Japan\u2013South Korea relations \u201cimportant.\u201d Regarding a potential Taiwan contingency, 42% viewed it as \u201crealistic,\u201d highlighting public divisions over how to respond, with opinions evenly split between \u201clogistical support\u201d and \u201cnon-intervention.\u201d Furthermore, trust in the U.S. \u201cnuclear umbrella\u201d stood at only 33%, with 49% responding that it was insufficient. At the same time, 63% opposed Japan acquiring its own nuclear weapons, highlighting public unease over nuclear deterrence as well as strong rejection of nuclear armament.<\/p>\n

Please refer to the attached document for details.<\/p>\n

Comparative data for the three countries will be published on the EAI website (in Korean) at 2:00 p.m. on August 28, and on the KEI website (in English) on August 29. The final analysis results are scheduled for release in October 2025.<\/p>\n

\n

Note<\/strong><\/div>\n

Survey Period<\/strong>
\nAugust 19\u201321, 2025 (online survey)<\/p>\n

Number of Responses<\/strong>
\n4,122 total (Japan: 1,037; U.S.: 1,500; South Korea: 1,585)
\nSurvey Overview<\/strong>
\nQuestions were organized into the following five categories, allowing for comparison with past surveys as well as international analysis:
\n1.Bilateral Relations \u2013 Impressions of the U.S. and South Korea, assessment of the importance of relations, and perceptions of political leaders in each country
\n2.Economy & Trade \u2013 Economic relations between Japan\u2013U.S. and Japan\u2013South Korea, free trade systems, and attitudes toward accepting foreign nationals
\n3.Security \u2013 U.S. Forces in Japan, defense cost-sharing, and perceptions regarding the Taiwan Strait and North Korea
\n4.Culture & History \u2013 Interests in U.S. and South Korean popular culture, historical issues, and evaluation of statement on the 80th anniversary of the end of the war
\n5.Trilateral Cooperation \u2013 Japan\u2013U.S.\u2013South Korea security cooperation, information sharing, joint training, and policy responses to a potential Taiwan contingency<\/p>\n

\n

Preliminary Findings of the First Japan\u2013U.S.\u2013Korea Public Perception Survey (Japanese Respondents)<\/strong><\/div>\n

API conducted the first Japan\u2013U.S.\u2013Korea Public Perception Survey in collaboration with EAI and KEI. This preliminary report summarizes the findings from the survey of 1,037 respondents in Japan. The survey highlights the candid views of the Japanese public on a wide range of topics, including perceptions of Japan\u2013U.S. and Japan\u2013South Korea relations, security perspectives regarding a potential Taiwan contingency and the North Korean threat, evaluations of economic and trade issues, attitudes toward accepting foreign nationals, and views on the pros and cons of nuclear armament. Key findings are presented below.<\/p>\n

\n1. Impressions of the United States and Japan\u2013U.S. Relations<\/strong><\/p>\n

    \n
  • 40.5% of respondents had a \u201cfavorable impression\u201d of the United States, while 34.5% had an \u201cunfavorable impression,\u201d showing a narrow margin. Reasons for favorable impressions included \u201can important partner for Japan\u2019s security\u201d (31.0%) and \u201cexercises leadership in the international community\u201d (16.0%). The most common reasons for unfavorable impressions were \u201ca negative impression of the U.S. president\u201d (41.2%) and \u201cstrong nationalism\u201d (28.9%).<\/li>\n
  • Regarding the incumbent President Trump, only 14.7% expressed a \u201cfavorable impression,\u201d while 70.1% reported an \u201cunfavorable impression.\u201d Furthermore, concerning the tariffs imposed by the second Trump administration (on automobiles, steel, aluminum, etc.), only 7.5% approved while 76.5% disapproved, indicating overwhelmingly negative sentiment.<\/li>\n
  • As for the Japan\u2013U.S. relationship itself, 42.4% of respondents described it as \u201cgood,\u201d while 34.9% described it as \u201cbad.\u201d On the other hand, 85.9% of respondents said that the Japan\u2013U.S. relationship is \u201cimportant\u201d for Japan, with only 6.1% giving a negative response. However, regarding future prospects, 44.7% answered that \u201cthe relationship will deteriorate,\u201d significantly exceeding the 23.6% who answered that it \u201cwill improve,\u201d highlighting strong public anxiety about the future.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

    2. Impressions of South Korea and Japan\u2013South Korea Relations<\/strong><\/p>\n

      \n
    • Only 24.8% of respondents held a \u201cfavorable impression\u201d of South Korea, while 51.0% held an \u201cunfavorable impression.\u201d Reasons for favorable impressions included \u201cattraction to Korean culture (films, music, sports)\u201d (33.5%) and \u201cattractiveness as a travel destination\u201d (19.1%). The main reasons for unfavorable impressions were \u201cconflict over historical perception (comfort women\/forced labor issues)\u201d (28.4%), \u201creports of anti-Japan demonstrations and statements\u201d (27.0%), and the \u201cTakeshima territorial dispute\u201d (12.1%).<\/li>\n
    • Regarding current Japan\u2013South Korea relations, 31.8% described them as \u201cgood,\u201d while 40.7% described them as \u201cbad.\u201d However, 54.1% responded that Japan\u2013South Korea relations are \u201cimportant\u201d for Japan, while 30.2% said they are \u201cnot important.\u201d Reasons for considering the relationship important included \u201cnecessary security cooperation\u201d (39.8%) and \u201cgeographical and cultural ties\u201d (33.7%). Conversely, reasons for considering it unimportant included \u201cstagnation on historical issues making strengthened relations difficult\u201d (26.8%) and \u201cdifferences in values\u201d (20.4%).<\/li>\n
    • Looking ahead to the next 3\u20135 years, \u201cno change\u201d was the most common response at 44.9%, while opinions were divided between \u201cimprovement\u201d (26.2%) and \u201cdeterioration\u201d (28.8%). Regarding priority goals for future Japan\u2013South Korea relations, \u201crestoring\/building mutual trust\u201d (23.3%) was most frequently cited, followed by \u201caddressing North Korea\u2019s nuclear issue\u201d (16.6%) and \u201cresolving historical issues\u201d (13.1%). Furthermore, 76.3% answered that the Takeshima issue is \u201cimportant for Japan\u2013South Korea relations,\u201d confirming it remains a significant challenge.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

      3. Perceptions Regarding a Taiwan Contingency<\/strong><\/p>\n

        \n
      • Regarding the possibility of a Taiwan contingency occurring, 42.1% answered \u201cyes,\u201d significantly exceeding the 18.7% who answered \u201cno.\u201d Furthermore, 77.1% stated that it is \u201cimportant for Japan\u2019s security and economy,\u201d indicating strong recognition of the issue as a major risk to national interests.<\/li>\n
      • The most serious impact cited was \u201csecurity risks to the southwest islands (Okinawa\/Senkaku)\u201d (28.3%), followed by \u201ceconomic losses due to disruption of maritime transport routes\u201d (18.3%) and \u201ccessation of semiconductor supplies from Taiwan\u201d (13.4%).<\/li>\n
      • Regarding the U.S. response, the most common view was that \u201cthe U.S. should intervene militarily in coordination with allies\u201d (41.4%). As for Japan\u2019s role, \u201cJapan should limit its role to logistical and humanitarian support\u201d (27.5%) and \u201cJapan should avoid military involvement\u201d (26.0%) received nearly equal support, while only 10.3% responded that \u201cthe Self-Defense Forces should participate in frontline combat.\u201d\n

        On the initial joint response by Japan, the U.S., and South Korea, \u201cdiplomatic measures\u201d (36.5%) and \u201ceconomic sanctions\u201d (24.0%) were the most common answers, while support for \u201cmilitary intervention\u201d remained relatively low at 12.3%.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

        4. Perceptions Regarding North Korea and Nuclear Deterrence<\/strong><\/p>\n

          \n
        • Regarding the threat posed by North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile programs, 42.5% of respondents answered that \u201cinformation sharing between Japan and South Korea is necessary.\u201d Proactive opinions included \u201cstrategic dialogue and policy consultations are needed\u201d (17.8%) and \u201can alliance should be considered in the future\u201d (12.3%). Conversely, 8.7% opposed security cooperation between Japan and South Korea.<\/li>\n
        • On the question of whether Japan should possess nuclear weapons independently, 23.7% were \u201cin favor\u201d (strongly in favor: 8.2%, somewhat in favor: 15.5%), while 63.0% were \u201copposed\u201d (strongly opposed: 43.6%, somewhat opposed: 19.4%), showing overwhelming opposition. Regarding South Korea\u2019s potential nuclear armament, only 15.5% expressed \u201csupport,\u201d while 65.0% were \u201copposed\u201d (strongly opposed: 40.9%).\n

          Although opposition to Japan\u2019s nuclear armament remains the majority view, the survey also indicates a noteworthy, if limited, level of growing support.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n

          5. Japan\u2013U.S.\u2013South Korea Security Cooperation<\/strong><\/p>\n