{"id":28229,"date":"2021-10-21T10:21:00","date_gmt":"2021-10-21T01:21:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/apinitiative.org\/?p=28229"},"modified":"2021-10-25T10:46:34","modified_gmt":"2021-10-25T01:46:34","slug":"what-needs-to-change-in-the-wake-of-the-u-s-withdrawal-from-afghanistan-by-jimbo-ken","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/apinitiative.org\/en\/2021\/10\/21\/28229\/","title":{"rendered":"What needs to change in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan by JIMBO Ken"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u201cAPI Geoeconomic Briefing\u201d is a weekly analysis of significant geopolitical and geoeconomic developments that precede the post-pandemic world. The briefing is written by experts at Asia Pacific Initiative (API) and includes an assessment of burgeoning trends in international politics and economics and the possible impact on Japan\u2019s national interests and strategic response. (Editor-in-chief: Dr. HOSOYA Yuichi, Research Director, API; Professor, Faculty of Law, Keio University; Visiting Fellow, Downing College, University of Cambridge)<\/p>\n

This article was posted to the Japan Times on October 21, 2021:<\/strong><\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/opinion\/2021\/10\/21\/commentary\/japan-commentary\/japan-us-afghanistan-2\/<\/a><\/p>\n

API Geoeconomic Briefing<\/h2>\n

October 21, 2021<\/strong><\/p>\n

What needs to change in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan<\/h3>\n

JIMBO Ken,
\n<\/font>MSF Executive Director, Asia Pacific Initiative (API);
\nProfessor, Faculty of Policy Management, Keio University\"\"<\/p>\n

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Just weeks ago, two decades of U.S. military engagement in Afghanistan came to a rather abrupt end.<\/p>\n

Twenty years ago, at the start of the so-called war on terror, the strategic impact of the Sept. 11 attacks was immense both for U.S. national security policy and the Japan-U.S alliance.<\/p>\n

At the time, the U.S. defined the threat of terrorism as a new type of war in the 21st century. As the nature of the threat was asymmetrical and unconventional, it required a major transformation in how the U.S. military operated. As a result, defense spending increased at a significant scale during the George W. Bush administration, both in terms of overseas contingency operations and expanded investments in areas such as counterinsurgency.<\/p>\n

As the anti-terrorism operation needed a global outreach, the world saw a new level of global cooperation, post-9\/11. The U.S-led coalition\u2019s intervention in Afghanistan, the NATO-led operation in Libya, the Saudi Arabia-led intervention in Yemen and maritime safety cooperation off the coast of Somalia, alongside global law enforcement and police cooperation, have evolved as platforms for global engagement for the U.S. and its coalition partners.<\/p>\n

Sept. 11, 2011, was also a turning point for the Japan-U.S. alliance in the global expansion of its function. With the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2001, Japan\u2019s Maritime Self-Defense Force provided logistical support in the Indian Ocean for the vessels of coalition forces engaged in the war on terror \u2014 officially named Operation Enduring Freedom. The SDF expanded its activities worldwide, including humanitarian relief and reconstruction services in Iraq and counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia.<\/p>\n

At the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (\u201ctwo plus two\u201d) meeting in February 2005, Tokyo and Washington agreed to pursue their alliance agenda through \u201cGlobal Common Strategic Objectives.\u201d In a meeting held the following year, then-U.S. President George W. Bush and then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi together heralded a \u201cnew U.S.-Japan alliance of global cooperation for the 21st century,\u201d pledging to stand together on common interests, such as winning the war on terrorism, securing freedom of navigation and commerce \u2014 including sea lanes \u2014 and upholding human rights.<\/p>\n

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Return of geopolitics<\/strong><\/p>\n

The prototype of post-9\/11 alliance cooperation has since been transformed on a significant scale. The \u201creturn of geopolitics\u201d \u2014 as described by foreign affairs expert Walter R. Mead \u2014 with the rise of Chinese military power, North Korea\u2019s nuclear and missile development, Russia\u2019s active intervention overseas and the power struggle concerning Iran, has become the central security challenge.<\/p>\n

Competitions over territories, sovereignty and maritime rights have intensified in both Asia and Europe, and gray-zone coercions \u2014 aggressive attempts to change the status quo through operations short of war \u2014 have become more serious. Hybrid warfare, in which the boundaries between military and nonmilitary activities are deliberately blurred, is conducted in such forms as operations by irregular forces, cyberattacks and influence operations including spreading disinformation.<\/p>\n

Due to the return of geopolitics, the Japan-U.S. alliance needed to treat symmetrical threats as primary security concerns. In particular, China\u2019s boosting of air and naval forces, the deployment of ballistic and cruise missiles and the modernizing of its nuclear capabilities are leading to an escalated strategic competition between China and the U.S.<\/p>\n

The United States\u2019 regional military advantage over China is no longer a given, and cannot be guaranteed in the future. China\u2019s anti-access\/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities have expanded dramatically, especially in areas facing the Western Pacific, bringing about a huge increase in costs for the power projection of U.S. forces.<\/p>\n

Inside the first island chain, an area that includes Taiwan and the South China Sea, China is becoming more confident in maintaining air superiority and naval superiority. Even in wider areas outside the first island chain, the U.S. faces China\u2019s area denial capability backed by ballistic and cruise missiles.<\/p>\n

The rise of China has therefore become a systemic challenge for American defense strategy and the Japan-U.S. alliance. The challenge requires transforming the U.S. strategy, force posture, way of fighting and budget allocation to squarely grapple with the strategic competition with China.<\/p>\n

Past administrations in the U.S. worked to reconfigure the strategy with a \u201cpivot to Asia,\u201d but the rebalancing of resource allocation to Asia went largely incomplete. The administration of former President Donald Trump\u2019s negotiations with the Taliban for a peaceful settlement and President Joe Biden\u2019s decision to withdraw American troops from Afghanistan have represented an end to the era of large-scale anti-terrorism intervention, and are shaping the U.S. to be ready for a true pivot to the Indo-Pacific region.<\/p>\n

The 2018 National Defense Strategy released by the Trump administration clearly stated that \u201cInter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.\u201d The U.S. Congress supports the Pacific Deterrence Initiative to boost finance for the vital military capability to deter China.<\/p>\n

However, strategic competition with China should be constructed under the premise that American superiority in conventional operating domains cannot be taken for granted.<\/p>\n

Washington is looking at defeating long-term strategic competitors by shaking the foundations of their power, making them waste their resources on inferior areas and defray the cost of their expansionist policies.<\/p>\n

U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a speech in July that the cornerstone of U.S. defense is \u201cintegrated deterrence,\u201d and the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been advancing a new so-called Joint Warfighting Concept based on multidomain operations that combine conventional arenas with space, cyberspace and electromagnetic domains.<\/p>\n

They are seeking new ways of fighting wars, such as diversifying combat capabilities but concentrating striking forces in times of attacks, or letting modular forces conduct operations autonomously even when a part of a chain of command is destroyed.<\/p>\n

By strengthening undersea warfare capabilities centered on submarines \u2014 an area in which the U.S. and its allies have a relative advantage \u2014 as well as capabilities in multidomains, the U.S. is pursuing a strategy of forcing China to bear heavier resource constraints.<\/p>\n

Recent developments including the creation of AUKUS, a new Indo-Pacific security alliance between the U.S., the United Kingdom and Australia that will enable Canberra to deploy nuclear-powered submarines, and the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee highlighting the importance of cooperation in domains such as space and cyberspace, should all be interpreted in the context of strategic competition.<\/p>\n

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Indo-Pacific shift<\/strong><\/p>\n

In the 2030s, competition among superpowers and a strategic competition involving China in the Indo-Pacific will become the major strategic concerns.<\/p>\n

The withdrawal from Afghanistan should become a cornerstone to build a foundation for concentrating U.S. strategic resources in the Indo-Pacific.<\/p>\n

The Japan-U.S. alliance, the \u201cQuad\u201d alliance \u2014 of Japan, the U.S., Australia and India \u2014 and AUKUS are the major strategic frameworks with which to strengthen efforts.<\/p>\n

For the U.S. to successfully shift its focus to the Indo-Pacific region, it is important that it makes clear its strategy of getting engaged in the area and its stance of attaching importance to coordinating interests with its allies and like-minded countries.<\/p>\n

Increasing distrust among European nations towards the uncoordinated U.S. pullout from Afghanistan, as well as France\u2019s anger over AUKUS that severely damaged its defense cooperation with Australia, are typical examples of a lack of consultation.<\/p>\n

The right strategic decision does not lead to desirable results if it is implemented poorly. The essence of success lies in the constant coordination of efforts between Washington and its allies and partners in the region.<\/p>\n

In order to realize a shift to the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. must:<\/p>\n