

台湾とウクライナ 挑戦する権威主義 読売国際会議 議事録（オリジナル音声）

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第1部 今そこにある紛争の危機（台湾とウクライナ）、第2部「台頭する権威主義の懸念」

第1部 今そこにある紛争の危機（台湾とウクライナ）



パネリスト

マイケル・マクフォール 米スタンフォード大教授

オリアナ・マストロ 米スタンフォード大FSIセンターフェロー

神保謙 APIプレジデント、慶應大教授（モデレーター）

動画

英語

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SJcy9CXK86o>

日本語

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=igG9EqR3D10>

神保謙

神保でございます。国際文化会館そしてAPIを代表して、今回の会議に参加いただいた皆様に深く感謝申し上げます。APIと国際文化会館は（昨年）7月に合併いたしましたので、ますます

シンクタンクとしてのプログラム部門を強化していきたいと思っていたところに、4人のスタンフォード大学からの賢人の皆様がこのプログラムに参加いただけるとうかがいまして、これをシンポジウムとして実現させたいと考えておりました。実現できて大変うれしく思っております。

第一部は「ウクライナと台湾」と題しまして、世界を震撼させたロシアのウクライナ侵攻から間もなく一年が経とうとしています。ウクライナ情勢とともに、台湾に対するインプリケーションとは何か、ということを中心に今日は議論を深めていきたいと思っております。1年が間もなく経過しようとしているロシアの侵略行為自体は、国際秩序の根幹を揺るがす事態であったわけですがけれども、他方でヨーロッパとアメリカは戦略的な結束を深めて、そして日本を含めた多くの国が対ロ制裁に加わり意思を共有する機会としてこの1年を過ごしてきたように思います。他方で子のウクライナの抵抗と主権を守る闘いは、まことに賞賛すべき教訓がたくさんあると思われ、我々も勇気づけられ、そこから学ぶことも多かったように思います。その一方で、国際社会は依然としてロシアのウクライナ侵攻にどのような形でロシア自身に対して高い代償を課して、その行為が完全に戦略的な失敗だったと結論づけることが重要だと私自身は考えているわけですがけれども、まだその最終的な段階にはいきついていない、まさに事態は on going な状況だと思っております。従って今年の事態がどう推移するのか、そして我々は何をすべきかのかということを今日議論していきたいと思っております。

そして今日のもう一つの議論である台湾については、前回の読売国際会議でも十分に議論されたと同様に伺っておりますけれども、台湾をめぐる戦略環境も緊張を増しているわけでご覧いただけます。特に中国は昨年秋に共産党第20回党大会を終えて、新しい指導部の体制になりました。台湾も民進党の新しい主席が誕生し、来年には総統選が開催される予定だと理解をしております。このような新しい環境の中で、またウクライナの教訓も踏まえながら、我々は台湾の戦略環境をどのように見定めるべきなのか、ということこそ是非うかがっていただきたいと思っております。

マイク・マクフォール教授に最初に質問を伺いたいと思っております。ご存じのようにマクフォール教授は、2011年12月から2014年までアメリカ・オバマ政権のもとで駐ロシア大使を務められた対ロ政策のエキスパートでございます。ウクライナの侵略という事態から、間もなく1年が経とうとしています。マクフォール大使から見て、この1年間の戦略的な教訓というものは一体何であったのか、そしてアメリカにとってのヨーロッパにおける抑止と防衛の構造にどのようなインプリケーションを与えたのか、まずこのあたりからお話を伺わせてください。

Dr. Michael McFaul

First of all, thank you, Professor Jimbo for having me and everybody. And it's good to see Ariana on the screen and the back of the heads of my colleagues as well.

I apologize, I was planning to be with you. And I avoided COVID in 2020. I avoided COVID in 2021, and 2022. But I did not avoid COVID in 2023. So that's why I'm not with you. But I look forward to being with you in the spring or summer time in the future. This is a very crucial time in the world when we're thinking about issues of deterrence.

Having just witnessed a historic meeting, here in Washington, between our leaders between Japanese leadership and American leadership, I look forward to the discussion that you'll have about the implications of deterrence in our bilateral relationship with respect to Taiwan.

But you asked me a different question, you asked me to reflect on deterrence, and the state of the war in Europe.

And I think the first observation, it's an obvious one, but I think we need to remember it before we get to all the great things that the United States and NATO and of course Ukrainian warriors have done on the battlefield in Ukraine is to, first, start by acknowledging that deterrence fail.

We did not deter Russia from invading Ukraine for a second time in 2022. We failed it deterrence back in 2014, when they first invaded Ukraine, and I think we could go back all the way to Georgia in 2008. And also say that deterrence failed then.

I think when we're left looking for lessons for what to learn from Ukraine, with respect to security issues and deterrence in Asia, I think we have to start with why did deterrence fail in 2022?

And I would say two or three things to that before talking about where we are at the war right now.

First, Mr. Putin, in his view in for his perception, I want to emphasize not my perception, but from his perception. Mr. Putin used military force several times before 2022. And he got away with it. You could go all the way back to the war in Chechnya, when he used force in 1999, 2000, but especially Georgia in 2008. Again, Ukraine 2014. I would add to that list Syria in 2015, when he deployed his Air Force to help keep in power, Mr. Assad.

And in all of those instances, he (Putin) took big risks in using military force and the three ladder cases abroad in foreign countries, and he was struck by the successes in his view of using military force and the lack of reaction from the west.

Let's not go back to those earlier cases. But After 2014, when he invaded Ukraine, there were sanctions, but relatively modest sanctions, there was no military assistance. And so he learned the lesson from that, that maybe if he did use military force, again, in 2022, there would be not a very big military response, and not a big economic response. I think if we think about how to make deterrence more effective with respect to Taiwan, I think it's important to learn to remember that we did not make those credible commitments to deterrence before 2022. And when we get to carry on and talk about Taiwan, I think we should think about concrete ways that you can enhance deterrence before, rather than waiting for military action to begin. That's the first thing I would say about the run up to the war.

Number two, I would remind everybody that doesn't think about Putin, as long as I have met Mr. Putin back in 1991, so we go way back. I've written a lot about him. And for five years, when I served in the Obama administration, I met him many times; I think it's important to remember about Mr. Putin, that he is very motivated by ideology, by a set of ideas about the world, that Trumps other kind of security considerations or economic considerations. And I think one of the mistakes we made in the run-up to the war was thinking, "well, this is irrational, he would never do

something so dangerous or so audacious, as to invade, let alone try to annex territory, because we were imposing our cost-benefit analysis on the way that he thinks." And Putin does not think like us. He is motivated by different things. And I'm happy to go in more of that later in questions. The one thing I want everybody remember that this was not a defensive war to stop NATO expansion. This was a war, to try to correct wrongs that go back in Putin's mind hundreds of years, to try to reunite in Putin's view, nations that were divided [between] Ukrainians and Russians, he doesn't believe they're different peoples. That is the crux of what motivated him to invade. And it was not these short-term calculations about security or economic interest. But then third, and I'll end with this, but obviously, to answer more questions. I think the other lesson is that he gravely miscalculated and many different fronts. Number one, he over-calculated in terms of the power of his own military capabilities. Remember, before February 24, 2022, most military analysts that I know here in the United States of America, including academics, including those that work in the CIA, including our top military experts on Russia in the US government, assumed that the Russian military was one of the top three most capable militaries in the world; the United States, China, Russia, those that were always the ranking. And if you added up the numbers of how many soldiers they had, how many tanks they had, how much money they spent on the military, as a percentage of their GDP. Russia looked on paper of having a lot of military capability. We now know that we overestimated that, that Mr. Putin in part because of the capabilities he had, in part because of bad strategy, and in part because of underestimating his enemy, the Ukrainian Armed Forces, that we overestimated the Russian military.

Number two, I just alluded to it. We underestimated the Ukrainian military. We don't have a lot of experts on the Ukrainian military. By the way, in the United States, it was striking to me in the run-up to the war and all the conversations I was in, including with senior government officials, including from time to time the President of the United States, how shallow our knowledge was about Ukrainian military capabilities. We had a ton of experts on Russia. We didn't have as many on Ukraine, so we underestimated their capabilities in two respects. One, we forgot that the Ukrainians had been fighting since 2014. I think that's another big distinction when we get to the comparison with Taiwan, that they've been fighting a war that they did not begin fighting the Russians in 2022. They've been fighting since 2014 training, including with the California National Guard to get better and had greater capabilities than I think we assumed.

And then third, Mr. Putin underestimated the response of the United States and NATO on the military side. And I would say the global community of democratic states, including Japan, on the economic side, they did not expect that we would be giving billions of dollars in military assistance to the Ukrainians, as fast as we did. They did not expect that many countries would be a part of this coalition, not just the United States. And on the economic side, they did not expect the comprehensive sanctions regime in place today, the most comprehensive sanctions regime implemented against another country in the history of sanctions, I believe, and most certainly in recent history in the last 30 years. And so that miscalculation, I think, has led to major Russian military defeats on the battlefield; they lost the battle of the key, around Kharkiv, the second largest city of Ukraine; the Ukrainian warriors then liberated Kherson, and have now rolled back 50% of the territories that the Russians have taken. And so that was surprising for Mr. Putin.

But I'll end this first question with a question mark about the future. I think 2022 will be remembered as a year of victory for the Ukrainian Armed Forces and a year of defeat for the Russian Armed Forces. That doesn't mean that 2023 or 2024, will also be that way. I think it's very

uncertain what happens in the future with respect to the way this war plays out. Maybe we'll get to that with it the next question. But victory in 2022 does not ensure victory in 2023.

神保謙

大変刺激的なお話を伺いました。長くプーチン大統領の思考を知るマクフォール大使だからこそ、なぜロシアが過少評価をし続け、そして我々が過大評価をしていたのかということが解きほぐされていくようなお話だったと思います。続けてマクフォール大使にもう一間伺いたいのは、最後にお示しになった点、「今後はどうなるのか」ということです。2022年のウクライナ側の抵抗、そしてある意味でのタクティカルな勝利というもものは、2023年でのより良い展開を約束したものではないというご発言がありました。だとすると、このウクライナ戦争はどのような形で戦争自体が終わっていくというシナリオを描くことが可能だという風に大使はとらえているのか。そしてそれは多分に大統領及びクレムリンがどのようにこの戦争から手を引くかということ判断させることにかかっているかというような気がしますが、マクフォール大使はこのあたりどのようにご判断されているのでしょうか？

Dr. Michael McFaul

Those are impossible questions to answer. They're too hard, as some easier ones, please. In all seriousness, I've been reading for an article I'm writing right now, all the assessments of the war back in January and February, and having read how badly we got those wrong. I am not brave enough to try to predict the future today. Because it is shocking how bad our assessments were, the assessments we made a year ago compared to today. But let me say a few things with that caveat as a preambular statement.

Right now, the Ukrainians believe that momentum is on their side. I speak to Ukrainian government officials rather frequently. I just did yesterday the senior Ukrainian officials, and their assessment is that this is the equivalent of 1943 in World War Two. That is, after the Battle of Stalingrad, that the Soviets won with Ukrainian soldiers to their, by the way, momentum had shifted. And it was just a matter of time, until they knew that the Soviet Union was going to defeat Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front. But remember, between 1943 and 45, there were many battles, lots of people died, and lots of destruction. But that is their mindset. They believe that the momentum is now on their side. But they also understand that it's going to be a long fight before they liberate all of their territories. And without question, they are still focused on that goal, whether right or wrong, or analysts we can debate. But I think it's important for people to understand that they are not trying to fight to get back to the February 24 borders, they are firmly focused on trying to liberate all of Donbass and the Crimea, and Crimea. To do so, however, they believe that they need new offensive military capabilities to achieve that objective. And therefore, whether they succeed or not, will depend on NATO, and will depend on the United States. There are three weapons systems in particular that they're focused on: tanks, fighter aircraft, jet fighters, and long-range missile systems. Attack guns are what they're called. And they believe that if they are provided those kinds of weapons in the numbers that they need, they can achieve victory in 2023. I'm not a military expert, but I want you to understand their mindset.

Conversely, if you look at what Mr. Putin is saying, I think he believes the time is on his side. He is not in a bigger rush in 2023, as what I hear from the Ukrainian side, he believes that if he can fight

to a stalemate in 2023, and just be basically at the same place, as they are today, the West and the international community of democratic states will begin to lose interest in the war. They are banking on the fact that there are already signs in my country, for instance, within the Republican Party, that there are critics of how much assistance we are providing to the Ukrainians. The last major package was \$45 billion was passed. Back in December, just a month ago, that's when the Democrats still controlled the House of Representatives. The Russian thinking is that if they can hold on and keep fighting to a stalemate, and they're preparing for their surges, and they're preparing to draft more soldiers, but I think they think the longer the war goes, the more likely that the West will give up on Ukraine. And that's when they will be able to do what is now, I believe, Putin's minimalist objective, which is to seize de facto, the four territories that he annexed on paper back in September. Those are the four eastern regions of Ukraine that he declared in a ceremony in September, as being now part of Russia. And so I don't have the courage to predict which two of those scenarios are true. But I hear a sense of urgency on the Ukrainian side. I hear a sense of time is on their side, from the Russian side.

神保謙

どちらに有利に働くのか、そして将来は一体どのように展開するのか、というまさに認識の戦いということも一方でこの戦争を形作る大変重要なポイントだという気がいたしました。それでは、会場にいるオリアナ・マストロ博士に話題を移したいと思います。皆さんご存じの通り、マストロ博士は、アメリカ及び中国双方の軍事戦略に関する専門家でございまして、Foreign Affairs を含む様々なジャーナルで積極的な発言をされている方です。ぜひオリアナさんに伺いたいのは、この習近平政権が第三期に入りまして、台湾の位置づけがどういう風に変化するとオリアナさんが見なしているかということをお伺いしたいと思います。中国の政治局の人事も新しくなりまして、中央軍事委員会（CMC）も新たなリーダーシップを迎えて、そして台湾はコアな戦略的ターゲットであり続けるということですが、オリアナさんは、どのような形で見ておられますか。

Dr. Oriana Mastro

Well, thank you for that question. And thank you for having me. Here, I was doing a review of my photos and my photo library to remind myself of the last time I was in Japan, and it was about 10 years ago. I tried to think of all the things that had changed in the past 10 years and until COVID, and until the decrease in relations between China in the United States, I spent most of my free time in China. And now, I'm much more interested in learning about allies and partners. And so I appreciate the invitation to be here to speak today.

There are a few points that I want to make about Xi Jinping and China's Taiwan policy. And then, I will pick up on something that Mike said about how to enhance deterrence. And I'll give you three points that I think we need to keep in mind when enhancing deterrence against China, and Taiwan contingency.

[First,] there was nothing surprising to me about the party congress. Nothing is surprising to me about Xi Jinping, most of the time, and the things that Xi Jinping says [and] how he acts, I think, from very early on, and 2013, he was very clear that enhancing China's role on the international stage was going to be a key part of the legitimacy of the Communist Party moving forward. And their understanding of enhancing that legitimacy is also about standing up to the bullying that

foreigners put onto China, and achieving their territorial integrity as they define it. I often say I spend, people asked me because I talk about conflict, if I have any issues in China; I have frequent interactions now on Zoom, but hopefully soon in person with the party with the military. There is nothing that I say about the fact that they want to take Taiwan and we'll take it by force, that is controversial in Beijing. It's only controversial, not so much now. But maybe a few years ago, when I started talking about the prospect of war over Taiwan, it's really only controversial to the rest of the world. That has seemed to have forgotten how politics works.

One lesson I hope everyone has learned is that governments and leaders in particular are still willing to fight wars and use force to gain territory that they feel is integral to their understanding of their power. So if anyone has any doubts about that before, I hope those doubts have been resolved.

At the party congress, Xi Jinping, as was mentioned, elevated certain military leaders to the Central Military Commission, which is the central decision-making body for military affairs. What was interesting, but not surprising, is that he elevated people with extensive expertise in the joint operational domain and with Taiwan contingencies from the regions of China that focus on those contingencies. One of the members that was elevated to vice chairman has experience in the joint operations center. It is not surprising [that] in Chinese media, they very openly call the Central Military Commission, the Taiwan clique, is a group of people who are continuing the focus that has been the focus for 25 years, and building a military that can take Taiwan by force. Now, I don't think Xi Jinping needs Taiwan to stay in power. This isn't an argument about weakness. It's not an argument that he feels pressure domestically pressure from other leads, he has to do it in this term, or he's going to be thrown out. There are many other factors that will determine whether Xi Jinping gets another term. Of course, if he succeeded in the Chinese terminology were unifies, he's guaranteed to continue power. But this is an important distinction; the motivation is to do, if you can do it as soon as possible, because you never know, as Professor McFaul said, you never know what the future holds. And we can sit potentially in Stanford or in Tokyo, and try to weigh the balance of power and say, "They were trying to get away, they'll still be, will they be powerful economically? What's the military balance of power in the 2030s?" But this is the most important issue for the Communist Party. They are long term, and they're thinking, the issue is that we are at the end of the long term. It's been over seven years. And they've been planning for this moment. So the premise is that Xi Jinping is easily determinable. He doesn't have to do it; there's no closing window of opportunity. But China wants Taiwan.

So what does that mean for our approach to deter him? There are three main things I keep in mind when I assess and provide guidance on US defense policy that I want to use to provide guidance today on Japanese defense policy. So I will say, I know there's that discomfort between a foreigner who knows nothing about Japan coming here to lecture you about your defense policy. So I just want to assure you that I lecture everybody about everything, you can ask my senior colleagues at Stanford, I have no shame and telling everyone that they need to be doing things differently. And these points are ones that I have recently made at the highest levels of the US defense establishment. So you are not alone. In the three things, I'm about to say. I am very positive about the changes Japan is about to increase in defense spending. The enhanced coordination between our militaries, the United States has also made significant changes in how we do business in Asia. But I'm not sure any of it matters, unless we meet three conditions.

The first one is whatever we do in the defense realm has to have an operational impact. I say this to the US military all the time. They say, "Oriana, we're deterring China, we sailed these aircraft carriers through near the Taiwan Strait enhance deterrence." That is interesting.

If a war breaks out, what are those carriers going to do? They're going to leave. So those carriers have no impact on preventing China from taking Taiwan in a wartime scenario; they do not deter China. And along those lines, from the Japanese point of view, enhancing your defense of the Senkaku, does nothing to deter China from taking Taiwan. Unless Japanese operations are going to be involved directly in stopping a Taiwan invasion or Chinese invasion of Taiwan, it's not going to have the impact that you think it will. So even in the United States, we say, "Oh, but we're doing so much more", if, in the end, China's still calculate that they can take Taiwan quickly and successfully before the United States, Japan, and the countries can intervene significantly. We're in the same position today than we were before all these changes.

The second point, which seems obvious, is China has to know about any changes that are made. Often, we get this picture that no one wants to upset China. So I'll get reassured both at the Pentagon and here in Tokyo, "don't worry, we're doing all the right things. We're just keeping it super secret." If the Chinese don't know about any of it, it does not enhance deterrence. They're still not taking it into account. And what we do in peacetime says a lot about what we will do in wartime. So I often have gotten reassured, don't worry when the war actually starts. Japan is definitely in. But it's too late. At that point, we're fighting a major, the largest war maybe the world has ever seen. So if, in peacetime, the Japanese military is not engaging in Taiwan, straits transits with the United States; it's reassuring that in wartime, we might be fighting together. But if there's no indication in peacetime, that's the case, it does not enhance deterrence. And the last point I want to make, and this again, seems obvious, anything we want to do to deter has to happen before the war starts. Again, it seems like an obvious point, but the view that for example, the Japanese public will support, "don't worry", I'm told, don't worry. Once the war starts, the Japanese public will be supportive, again, too late. There has to be signs we have to let the Chinese know now that there is that support. There was a series of writings in Chinese journals after the invasion of Ukraine, in which they talked about the failure of deterrence and how Russia did not expect the level of sanctions that occurred. And there were a lot of indirect please and these Chinese writings that said, if the picture is different than what we currently assess the United States, you should probably let us know, sometime soon, because their assessment is that the economic, political, and military costs are going to be acceptable. And while there's progress towards how we talk about Taiwan, how we're thinking about this issue, fundamentally and operationally, nothing has changed to the degree that makes me think that we resolved this issue.

神保謙

ありがとうございます。こちらも刺激的な話だったと思います。オリアナさんにもぜひ今のお話に関連して伺いたいのは、最初のポイントでアメリカの空母打撃軍の平和時におけるいわゆるストラテジック・メッセージングというのは、有事においてまったく違った展開になるだろうということをおっしゃいました。他方でアメリカの軍関係者のストラテジーを見ていると、アメリカの陸海空海兵隊のそれぞれが、どうやっていわゆる Anti-access、A2AD のエリアの中で戦うことができるかということ、苦心して今考えていると。もしこれにギブアップしたら遠くから戦うしかないんですけれども、もしこの A2AD 圏内の中でどのように戦えるかということを一生涯懸命考えて、日本

がそこでどのような形で共同作戦のレベルを上げていくのかというのは、ここを考えなくてはいけないポイントだと思うんですけども、でもオリアナさんのアセスメントはどうなんでしょうか？アメリカは、中国の軍事的な近代化、オペレーションの変化に対して必要な投資をしているのか、アメリカ軍が今宣言しているような形で、中国との戦い方を formulate していると言えますか？それとも全く投資が足りていないと判断しているのか、その辺りはいかがでしょうか？

Dr. Oriana Mastro

I give a talk often at the Pentagon, in which I try to explain why the United States is doing so little, and so late. To me, it's the biggest mystery of all of this. I spend so much time talking about the threat talking about the sense of urgency, and then you actually look at what's being done. And we are far from doing enough. I'm obviously here speaking in my civilian capacity, and my views do not represent those of the US government, the United States Air Force or the United States Department of Defense. But in my military job, I spent 13 years trying to deal with this issue of fighting within the A2AD envelope. And we have resolved nothing in 13 years. We cannot defend our bases. I spent years of the Pentagon working on base resiliency efforts. How can we make it so even if China attacks Kadena, we can defend Kadena, we can't, same with Guam, they're easily saturated by Chinese missiles. The only I'm often asked - how do we enhance deterrence in space, keep China from attacking our space assets, keep China from attacking Kadena, and keep them from attacking our ships. The only thing I can come up with is what I call "operational resilience". It's extremely attractive for China to attack us in these ways, because of how great the impact is on our ability to operate. Right now the only airfield the only base we have in the combat range of Taiwan is Kadena; we have one you shoot a bunch of missiles at Kadena, the United States Air Force can no longer operate to establish air superiority. The Navy surface [inaudible] is not common. So China wins the war. You blind our satellites. We can't talk China wins the war. So the only things I can think of is trying to create resilience and that can be more redundancy.

But more and more I think that's about including allies and partners. Because China is extremely concerned about widening this war. They only when Taiwan if the war is short, it's geographically limited to Taiwan, and only involves the United States potentially in Taiwan. So I am convinced that if Japan were to commit to fighting with the United States in this contingency, that would be enough to deter China, because the aggregation of our forces, outmatched China's, but more importantly, the geography. Someone over dinner yesterday said to me, "they were worried", they said, "Well, you know, Oriana takes our submarines two to three days to get there." It takes our submarines three to four weeks to get there. And so even if most of the fighting is going to happen with the United States in China, the bottom line is the most useful thing is that Japan has to hold the Chinese off in the immediate beginning of the war to give the United States time to get there. So I have this meeting with some former Secretaries of Defense, the day we land. And so I have this document of what do we need to do because I often get asked, "How do we determine how do we convince China that can't do this? What should our communication strategy be?" And I always say, well, first, that actually has to be true. Or probably you'd be better off convincing them of something that's true. So the United States needs more platforms, then we need munitions for those platforms, we do not have even close to enough munitions to even put a dent in the invading force that's coming across the strait. We have to be able to be flexible about when the war starts. So this means that, I think Xi Jinping is going to start moving the invading force before he launches a missile campaign against Taiwan; politically, we're all limited in what we can do until the war actually starts. And so we have to be agile in that. And then we need more places to operate from

the Access base in an overflight. And we need our allies and partners to be behind us. Once we get those four things in line. Then the fifth one is to make sure China knows that the US had allied capability has changed. But the Chinese aren't stupid, and they're not easily tricked. So I don't think we can convince them that there's been a significant change in our capabilities to operate in this A2AD envelope, unless we actually make changes to make that true.

神保謙

ありがとうございます。ここからは、ぜひウクライナと台湾の双方の関係について聞いてみたいと思います。特に、ヨーロッパ、ロシアを専門にしているマクフォール大使がアジアの戦略環境をどう見ているのか、そしてアジアの戦略環境を専門にしているオリアナさんが、ウクライナから学べる教訓は何かということをそれぞれお伺いしたいと思います。

マクフォール大使、冒頭の発言の中で、「まず認識しなければいけないことは、我々はロシアを抑止しなければいけないことに失敗したんだ、しかも何回も失敗したんだ」ということからお話を始められました。ここから我々は中国を見た場合に、先ほどオリアナさんが発言された極めて厳しいアセスメントから考えてみても、中国に対する抑止を失敗させないために、我々は何をするべきなのか。マクフォール大使がウクライナ戦争を通じて見たアジアの戦略環境への教訓にはどんなことをお感じになるか、ぜひ聞かせてください。

Dr. Michael McFaul

Great questions. I want to emphasize I'm not an expert on China, or Taiwan or the US military. But I listened to Oriana a lot. And I agree with everything she said about deterrence. I think that is the lesson of the failure of deterrence in Europe that should be done now with respect to how to avoid war, concerning Taiwan. Think about what if, instead of announcing a few weeks ago, that the United States is going to send a patriot battery, that 20 years ago, the United States sent patriots or fan or Aegis SM three missiles that are on Aegis ships or sometimes they're now in Romania and Poland? What if we had put in a multi-layered missile defense system many, many years ago? Rather than trying to start right now, think about how that may have changed, Putin's thinking about invading. One of the things I think we all need to study again, I'm not an expert, but I listening to Ukrainian speak about this is what we've learned about missile defenses, how useful cruise missiles are or not, how useful drones are or not, and what can be defended with different kinds of platforms. I think there's a lot that can be learned. And I think there are some misconceptions, particularly about cruise missiles, by the way, that if we learned we might be able to enhance, especially those defensive capabilities now.

Second, I would say the same thing about offensive capabilities. Ukrainians received a very important weapon, it's called a HIMARS. It's a medium-range, missile system, a multiple rocket launch system. It has changed a lot on the battlefield. But they didn't receive that before the war. They received it midstream during the war. And so the more of those kinds of systems that are in place ahead of time, you're obviously going to enhance deterrence. And third, I would add that, on the economic side, I was part of the negotiations, discussions, as an outsider with colleagues of mine in the Biden administration, about whether they should be specific about what economic sanctions they would impose if Russia invaded. And at the time, I was a proponent for announcing

those ahead of time, along the lines of what Oriana said it does no good after the fact. You don't determine anything if you do it after the fact. My argument was announced ahead of time, so that Putin will know exactly what we planned to do. One of the reasons I was a proponent of that is that I wanted to tie our own hands. Because I was worried that we might think, "Well, let's not do the most extreme measures." And so if you announce it ahead of time, you make your commitment to that more credible than not. But the reason that was given by White House officials, to me, why they did not want to do that, is they worried that trying to have a debate about sanctions among the democratic states that we're going to impose them ahead of time, would show our divisions. And I'm just reporting that I don't know whether that was right or wrong.

But I think if there's a way on the economic side, to say ahead of time, of what we plan to do, that would be a lesson learned, a failure from deterrence, that we learned in Ukraine that we might achieve with respect to Taiwan and China.

And then the last lesson, I alluded to it, but let me be more explicit about it. And I want to be careful here, because I'm not an expert. But I did travel with Oriana, and Larry, who's with you, to Taiwan over the summer. And what was striking to me was [that] Taiwan senior officials talked about their preparations for war, compared to what the Ukrainians were doing for years.

It just struck me that the Ukrainians were way more prepared for this war than Taiwan is today. Simple things like military spending, training, four months versus a year versus two years. And as I already said, combat experience. So the more of that can be done ahead of time. I think there's another important lesson in terms of deterrence.

And then finally, I would just say, just to echo something Oriana said that, that sometimes leaders can be motivated by ideas, ideologies, and grievances from the past, that will cause them to not worry about the consequences, the costly consequences of war, either with respect to soldiers, costs of war, or sanctions. But you want to present an argument about those costs, not just to try to sway Xi Jinping, but to think about all of Chinese society, all of Chinese economic actors so that they know that this will be catastrophically costly for everyone. This will not be a limited war. It won't be something that will just happen overnight. And I think engaging in that debate ahead of time can also enhance deterrence.

神保謙

大変面白かったです。オリアナさんにもぜひ同じ質問をしたいと思います。ウクライナからの教訓というのは、アメリカと日本が何を学ぶかということと同時に、まさに中国、習近平が何を学んだか、という両方にかかる質問だと思います。どちらかでも構わないし、両方でも構わないですが、オリアナさん、いかがでしょうか？

Dr. Oriana Mastro

Thank you for that. I think there are many things that all sides should be learning. And I'm happy that you've also asked what lessons we should learn because often I get the question, "What lesson should China learn?" And more specifically, "what lesson should China learn from Russia's failures?" And I often point out that we never asked what lessons the US military should learn from Russia's failures. In that, we like to think of Ukraine as Taiwan and Russia as China. But the Chinese think about Russia as the United States. There has been a great power in decline, that lashes out that has

large, bulky equipment that doesn't have the resolve to fight the way the Ukrainians do. I mean, that's how China sees itself, right? The United States has aircraft carriers, they have DF-21, DS, maybe the United States will fight but they're not willing to pay the same costs the Chinese are. And so I think China is paying attention, but it isn't the case that the lessons they've learned, are that their military can't do this. And they haven't learned the lesson that the cost would be too high, for two reasons.

The first is they also have seen the Russian military struggle. And there are sort of three main reasons to simplify why the Russian military has had difficulty: munitions command and control and logistics. Now the Chinese and, in particular, under Xi Jinping in 2013, Xi Jinping took a look at his military. And he did what Putin probably should have done before the invasion of Ukraine. He said, "Well, you guys have a lot of fancy stuff. I don't know if any of you know how to really use any of it." Well, he thought his forces were poorly trained that they were unable to engage in joint operations. There used to be specials on Chinese TV to show the mobility of the force, that was just Chinese troops moving from one city to another city. And I used to say, in my courses, if you need to make a big deal out of the fact that your military can move from one part of your country to another part of your country, all that says is how immobile you are. So the Chinese recognize they have these challenges. And under the guidance of Xi Jinping, they've engaged in massive organizational reforms to improve, so the joint logistics command was just set up, holding their command and control. So people often ask me, "why haven't tried to take in Taiwan yet?" It really is because these organizational changes just were put into place about two years ago. And so now China wants to do a series of exercises to make sure that everything's the way it is. So if anything, it's not like Ukraine was shocking to them militarily. But it does highlight how important command and control and logistics are. Taiwan was so important. They wanted to be sure that they had everything set anyway. Maybe now we can say they want to be extra sure that command and control and logistics are solid before we go.

On the economic side, I think the Chinese felt like they had to put in some extra work to figure out to make sure that countries were not going to severely sanction China in the event of an attack on Taiwan. I don't think limited economic sanctions would be enough to deter Xi Jinping. I think we need a level of economic disengagement that would cause depression in China, not a decrease in GDP growth, but sort of negative growth of 15,20, 25% that first year to have any impact. And my understanding, talking to people in the region, is there's not a lot of appetite, with countries to put that level of sanctions on China. China's not Russia. Singapore might proudly put sanctions on Russia, but they have less than 2 billion trades with Russia, and 60 with China. And so I think there's a lot of work to be done there. And to Mike's point, we seek war games stuff all the time, right contingency plans, what is our military going to do? What is your military going to do? And it's my understanding that we don't go into that level of work in detail on the economic and diplomatic side. But maybe we should, I'll tell you the lessons that we should learn. And this is where you can tell that I get increasingly frustrated by these questions. There is no sense of real urgency about this. I know we all talk about how there's a new sense of urgency. Deterrence is expensive. And there's trade-offs.

But there's one thing that is more expensive than deterrence. And that is a major war. So when I hear, even in the United States, and in Japan, the economic costs, Japanese and US businesses are not happy with the idea of a, b and c, I was I briefed bankers for three days in New York recently, how many times they said to me, "Oriana, but if there's a war over the Taiwan Strait, Tesla's will be

delayed." And I said, "nobody cares about your Teslas. I'm sitting there looking at tens of thousands of people being killed and the prospect of nuclear war. I don't care about your Tesla and, you're just gonna have to use like your old iPhone for another couple years, like you'll survive."

Yes, there are economic costs to deterrence. Maybe many of our companies both in the United States and Japan want to be able to trade [and] manufacture certain things in China. Well, I'm sorry, you can't, that that time is over. The South Koreans don't want the United States to use our assets in South Korea, to deter China, I'm sorry, South Korea, this strategic environment has changed. We should not be concerned about sparking this war. I hear this a lot in the United States, too. What if we say something, we do something and then we cause a war, that didn't need to happen? The bottom line is [that] there's no scenario in which China gets full control over Taiwan peacefully. On a good day, 6% of the people of Taiwan are willing to consider being a part of the PRC. This can only happen by force. So the question is, do we want a happy China that is undeterred or an unhappy China that's deterred? Those are only two options. And so there's a lot of, I'll give you one last example, I recently was advising the US military that they need to have a certain war plan. And again, they said to me, Oriana, you don't understand anything about how wars are fought, it'll take us 18 months to put together this plan. I said, Okay, if China attacked Taiwan tomorrow, how long would it take you to put together the plan? Six days, then do it in six days. Let's start thinking about how to actually change the environment with the sense of urgency that we need, because my biggest fear is that we're going to find ourselves in a major war. And it's not even the cost of the war, which will be massive. But, I go to China all the time, and I have close interactions with Chinese colleagues while I have a different opinion with the Chinese government on a number of issues. I understand their position on many of those issues. If I were Chinese, I'd be doing the same things. I don't think of any scenario in which we find a major war with China, and then any of us could have any interaction with that country ever again, we're going to be in two blocks for the rest of my lifetime. And that, to me, just seems so sad that it's worth maybe, having to pay a bit more taxes. People of Taiwan, I know you don't want to serve in the military, but guess what, too bad you live in Taiwan, you have to serve to protect the island. So there are sacrifices that are going to have to be made. But the alternative in my view is worse. And so I hope that that's where the debate is going, and we get the motivation, we need to make the changes that are necessary.

Dr. Michael McFaul

Can I make one comment?

Dr. Ken Jimbo

Sure, please go ahead.

Dr. Michael McFaul

One piece on the economic side, in terms of a lesson, just echoing some of the things Oriana said. I just want to remind everybody that in the run-up to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, that the consensus among bankers and oil companies and those that did business with Russia was this would be a small interruption, but basically, there's too much interdependence here for us to cut off particularly on oil and gas in Europe. That was the debate in February. I think it's important and instructive, and I hope Beijing is paying attention. That turned out to be not true. It turned out that it was possible to reduce drastically oil and gas coming into Europe, and that they took the sacrifices that Oriana is talking about Europeans have done that. And as a result, there are significantly less resources today to fight their war than they anticipated. Thousands of companies left Russia willingly, not because

governments sanctioned them, but because they said we cannot do business with this barbaric country. And I think we need to remember that if China unprovoked, invades Taiwan, at least in my country, it will be impossible for companies to say, "well, that some dispute they had a long time ago, is not our business." There's no way politically that will fly. And I think that is very important to look at just how much economic dislocation happened with a country that was not integrated into the global economic world in the same way that China has. I think the politically in the same way that Xi Jinping is motivated ideologically, and he's willing to take economic risks of that. I think people are underestimating how much political pressure there will be. And I'm not speaking about Japan. I don't know the politics in your country. But when people are dying in Taiwan, because of this horrible invasion, it will be impossible for American companies, banks, all of the companies that do business there to say, "no, we stopped that we have to move on," I think it'll be a very big dislocation that will have very deep economic consequences for the Chinese economy.

神保謙

ありがとうございました。日本にとっての意味を数点述べたいと思います。日本にとってのロシアのウクライナ侵略の最大のインプリケーションは、どのように抑止構造を日本は構築することができるか、ということを知り取らないといけない、ということだと思います。その結果国民が選んだことの最大のポイントは、防衛力の抜本的な強化ということに関する広いコンセンサスが形成されたということで、その表れとなったのが、12月に通りましたいわゆる戦略3文書ということになると思います。ただそこで我々が選んだものは、必ずしも例えば中国の防衛力にキャッチアップするとか、軍事力や戦闘機、艦艇の数をそこに伸ばしていくということではなくて、力の差は厳然とある、日本の方が劣勢になっているということは、ある意味最初に当然視した上でなんですけれども、その上で中国のいわゆる現状変更をするような作戦遂行能力を拒否するだけの力は持つ。しっかりと、いわゆる拒否能力というものを確立していくということ、我々は今遂行しようとしているということだと思います。そこに日本自身ができそうなことを可能な限り拡大をさせていけば、より地域の抑止力ということにも繋がり得るし、今アメリカはただで抑止力を提供しているわけではなく、そこにしっかりと共有された利益というものがあればこそ、抑止力というのは発揮されているとすれば、そこに日米がどのような形で共同の抑止力を構成していくかということが、我々にとっての最大の課題になるであろうということをお知らせ申し上げます。ぜひ皆さんから質問を受け付けたいと思います。まず、事前にいただいていた質問で、「日台関係推進において必要なことは、日本でアメリカのような台湾関係法のようなものは可能でしょうか？」というご質問がありました。オリアナさんに、日本と台湾の関係に何を求めたいですかということについては後ほど聞きたいと思いますが、その他質問があれば手を挙げてください。

江藤名保子

地経学研究所中国グループ長の江藤と申します。本日は刺激的な議論をありがとうございました。私からはオリアナさんに、戦略的な合理性から抑止についてお話くださったと思うので、その続きとして見込みをお伺いしたい点がございまして。今日のお話の中で、最悪の事態を想定して抑止力を高めることの必要性を強く訴えられていたと思いますが、中国政治を専門としている者としては、中国は当然負けないための中国側の軍事力の拡大というものを続けていくと考えています。その結

果エスカレーション・ラダーが上がっていくということになってしまいます。この競争に勝てる勝算はどの程度あるのかということをお伺いしたいです。政治学の観点からですと、やはり権威主義体制の方が合理性を無視して軍拡競争を展開できると考えます。この点アメリカ側は民意というのが障害として出てきますが、アメリカとしては捨てられないポイントであると考えます。この点をどう考えるかお伺いしたいです。

鈴木一人

地経学研究所所長の鈴木と申します。deterrenceとしての経済制裁というのは果たしてどこまで有効なのか。先ほどのマクフォールさんのお話の中では、deterrenceをもっときっちりと実施するためにも経済制裁のメニューについてはしっかり提示すべきである、というお話がありましたが、果たして経済制裁というのはどこまでdeterrenceの機能を持つのか。経済制裁の場合は、経済的なcalculationというものが成立しなければ、行動を抑止することは難しいと思うのですが、プーチンのウクライナ侵攻は、必ずしも経済的な合理性だけで動いていたとは思えないわけで、その場合経済的な合理性とは違う合理性をどうやって抑止することができるのか、その辺のお考えを伺うことができればと思います。

神保謙

ありがとうございます。まずオリアナさんに質問したいと思います。最初の質問にあったように、アメリカと中国は、エスカレーション・ラダーを上げていくという競争はどこまで、アメリカ側から戦い抜けるか、ということと、もう一つは日本と台湾との関係で、オリアナさんが期待することは何か、ということを知りたいと思います。そして、マクフォール大使には、経済制裁は抑止のツールとしてどれほど有効ですか、ということを知りたいと思います。

Dr. Oriana Mastro

Thank you. So the first thing I just want to say is I'm not sure I agree with the premise and the question about the expansion of autocratic regimes, and in this case, China is not rational about their defense spending. One of my primary complaints in the competition is that the Chinese seem to be much more pragmatic and rational in their spending than the United States is.

One of the statistics I'd like to give is that the war in Afghanistan costs the equivalent of ten Belt and Road Initiatives.

Many years up into the early 2000s, the United States spent more on its nuclear weapons than the Chinese spent on a toll military. The competition hasn't been because China's outspent us this whole time. And even today, we have more economic resources, the United States alone, and most definitely the United States and Japan than China. [China has] been very entrepreneurial, however, and the types of military capabilities they built so that they don't fall into the trap of being outspent the way the Soviet Union did.

But I take your general point: there is no end to this. I only have ideas about how to deter the conflict for now. But absolutely anything we do, China is then going to have to go back to the

drawing board and figure out how to counter it. If Japan and the United States clearly bring our forces together, so our Navy's bigger than China's, they might build more ships. They might seek foreign alliances with Russia. If we put missiles in second island chain countries, they will increase the ranges of their missiles to take out those missiles before they attack Taiwan. But the point is, there's no closing window. They're not going to risk losing Taiwan, and they have confidence in their ability to figure out counters. So it's not the case that we make an advancement. And then they're like, "We have to invade Taiwan tomorrow because of this advancement." But they will figure out a way eventually. And all I can say is I hope for some sort of completely unpredictable situation in the world that makes this Taiwan problem go away. I don't know what that would be. But I don't have any ideas. I just have ideas about how to delay it.

And then they'll say about Taiwan-Japan relations. In the United States, at least, I often put this in the camp of it has no operational impact, so we should not do it. So I wrote some op-eds for the New York Times when Nancy Pelosi went to Taiwan when President Biden made statements about defending Taiwan. If this just upsets China, and it does not improve our military prospects at all, I do not support it. But when we were in Taiwan, I had a bit of a change of heart, because what we learned from senior leaders in Taiwan is they felt like those political maneuvers increased the morale of the people of Taiwan to fight. And we do need the people of Taiwan to be able to hold off. So there seems to be some trade off. So for Japan, if you say to me, "Listen, if we increase our relationship with Taiwan and make some political changes in our support for Taiwan, and institutions, or we call Taiwan by a different name, or we do all these things" - that obviously the PRC will be upset about. But this is what's necessary to get the Japanese people on board with the defense of Taiwan, that I would say we should do it. But if it doesn't actually change anything in terms of the operational picture, I think it's very provocative for little benefit.

神保謙

ありがとうございます。それでは最後にマクフォール大使お願いします。

Dr. Michael McFaul

I know our time is limited, and I'm about to lose my voice. So I'll be brief. Even dictatorships have interests, group politics. Even dictatorships have societal preferences that don't always align with the general secretary or Mr. Putin. And what is striking, looking at what's happening domestically inside Russia today, is that economic elites - none of them think this war was a good idea. All of them are suffering, except one or two companies, state-owned enterprises close to the President.

And that will be exacerbated, I think, in multiple ways, greater in China, because China is so much more connected to the outside world. And so we're talking about a global depression, not a recession. From the statistics I've seen, if we're serious about sanctions, it will lead to a global depression, that will also destroy the Chinese economy. And I think the clearer we can make that, that this will be the economic implication, the better chance we have of, as Oriana said, kicking the can down the road, because Xi Jinping may be obsessed with his place in history. But there are, I know, many Chinese elites that radically disagree with his calculations. And so we want to make them understand the giant consequences of those actions. And I'm convinced that we do have the capabilities to put in those kinds of sanctions. We haven't even used the word embargo yet. But there are ways to make this very costly, if we have the will to do it. And then second, would we credibly communicate it ahead of time as a way to enhance deterrence?

神保謙

ありがとうございました。おかげさまで大変充実した議論を紹介することができたと考えております。この議論は今年も安全保障・戦略論の中心を占める課題となるでしょう。年の初めに、今後の展開を見定めるかにあたって大変重要な議論になったのではないかと考えております。

第2部 台頭する権威主義の懸念



パネリスト

フランシス・フクヤマ 米スタンフォード大教授
ラリー・ダイヤモンド 米スタンフォード大教授
筒井清輝 米スタンフォード大教授（モデレーター）

動画

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0D8II1oRMU>

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

thank you very much everyone for coming to this session. Second panel.

My name is Kiyoteru Tutsi. I'm a faculty member in the sociology department at Stanford University. But more relevant here, I'm the Director of the Japan program at Asia Pacific Research Center at Stanford, and on behalf of Stanford University, Freeman Spogli Institute, and Asia Pacific Research Center. We'd like to thank the Asia Pacific initiative for hosting this event here, and especially for the Yomiuri Shimbun for helping with the organization and the reporting and all of that.

Much has been said about the recent decline in democracies and the rising growing challenges of authoritarianism in the world, and Larry Diamond here has written this book *Ill Winds* which has been translated into Japanese last year. It was written a couple of years ago. In that book, he was very alarmed about the recent developments, and he talked about how this situation of democracies today might be the worst in [around] 40 years of his career, watching democracies and evolution of democracies in the world. "Given that it has been a couple of years since he wrote this book, amidst the dark shadows of the Trump administration in the United States, with a still very much rising China, and a Ukraine war that hadn't happened at the time, I would like to ask Larry's views today, whether the situation has gotten better since the time he wrote the book. Including the recent Democratic recession in historical context, what are your views on the state of democracy in the world today? what factors really contributed to the decline? If there's a slight upward trajectory, what have changed?

Dr. Larry Diamond

Thank you, Kiyo, and it's great to be with all of you at this revered institution of American engagement with Japan. The world entered a democratic recession around 2006, after a long period of continuous expansion of freedom and democracy in the world of gradual expansion that began with the so called third wave in the mid-1970s, and then exploded in the late 1980s and 1990s. It slowed down again, and around 2006 started trending downward in terms of levels of democracy and levels of freedom. It's not that those levels are so much lower today than they were in 2006. It's that they've been creeping downward steadily since 2006. The method of democratic demise in the world during this period has basically been by gradual deterioration.

If the quality of democracy starts deteriorating and anti-democratic forces start rising, it should be deeply worrisome to us: not only for normative reasons, but also because it could mean that democracy in many of these countries will essentially disappear, as it has, for example, in Hungary without much of the world fully acknowledging it.

What has changed [since my book] is that democracy in the United States is in better shape. [On] the trends that identified the global democratic recession, one major contributing factor was the decline of democracy in the United States, our severe political polarization, the rise of right wing and liberal populism, its rise in Europe as well, and the retreat of democracy, as I mentioned in the case of Hungary. The damage this did to the image of democracy globally, the sense that democracy was a system that worked, that was resilient and had some degree of moral consistency, had such an impact so that increasingly, we look like hypocrites. It was happening at a time when China was rising relentlessly in the last three decades or so, but particularly in this century, and when Russia seemed "resurgent". Judgments about regime legitimacy, which way the world is going, are always comparative. People are always comparing their regimes against other regimes, and certain types of regimes against other types of regimes globally. For quite some time, autocracy, even severe autocracy in the form of the People's Republic of China, in particular, just seem to work better, get more done, believe in itself more and more dynamic. I think we can explore in greater depth, why democracy in the US, is not as much in crisis now as it was, frankly, during the four years of the Donald Trump administration, which were the four worst years for democracy in the United States in many decades, if not since the Civil War. However, it's not only because Trump lost power, it's because we had a president come in who was more clearly committed to democracy. We made some important and promising political reforms that I talked about in my book at the state level, which is where I think we're going to get a lot of political

reforms. In 2022, even though a lot of people had essentially voted to sanction the effort to undemocratically overturn the 2020 presidential election, the Republican Party took control of the Congress by a much smaller margin, and the extreme election deniers in the swing state were virtually all defeated.

Another factor is that authoritarianism doesn't look like a great proposition today.

Xi Jinping has massively mismanaged COVID. Xi turns on a dime all of a sudden, and says, Okay, you want me to open, up to a million of you die, and it could be 2 million. Too bad. You asked for it. I'm sorry, I don't say this because I'm an American nationalist or an anti-communist. I say this because Xi Jinping is who he is. Mao murdered some 30 million Chinese? No one really knows. You think Xi Jinping is not capable of that? His image in the world now is more tarnished. Economic growth in China is severely impaired. The competition between democracy and authoritarianism doesn't look as depressing for the Democrats as it did just two or three years ago. As was noted in the last session, Putin has just catastrophically miscalculated.

This gives us new means to wage the argument that when you don't have checks and balances of some kind, even without Western or liberal democracy, full electoral accountability, when you don't have some checks and balances, and diffusion of power and constitutional processes, then unaccountable power-hungry rulers are liable to make egregious and catastrophic mistakes.

This is not only a lesson we're seeing unfolding now in China and Russia. Look at what's happening in Iran. Iran is really unraveling. The economy is a basket case. Maybe 20% of the population support the regime. Large numbers of Iranian youth have made clear they're willing to die rather than live under it any further. Women have stepped forward and risked their lives to challenge this regime, many of them paid the ultimate price. Venezuela has had at least a quarter of the population leave, because the Bolivarian socialist dictatorship has run the country into the ground. What has not changed is some of the deeper drivers of the democratic recession.

To my mind, the single biggest one, which by the way doesn't seem to be as big a problem in Japan as in many other advanced industrial democracies, is social media. I cannot tell you how much damage it's done to destroy the social fabric of truth and credibility and polarized society into tribal camps who don't have the same facts.

70% of the reliable Republican voters really believes without any evidence, and with 80 different courts including courts with Trump appointed judges ruling otherwise, that Trump won the 2020 election. A lot of that is due to disinformation and social media. We have not found a way to temper, fight and win the battle for truth.

The second is the corrupting influence of dirty money around the world and its corrosive effect on the rule of law in the United States, in Europe and the quality of our institutions. Again, I don't know about Japan, someone here can comment on that.

The third has been deindustrialization in the United States and Europe and the shift of manufacturing jobs to less developed economies, which has hollowed out the industrial working class and has not only just made life difficult for them in terms of their income, but it's been humiliating for them as work is a very important part of identity.

If you lose your job, you know, you lost your c, in a way. They see all these immigrants coming into the United States with no control of our borders, or at least, that's the narrative. Right now, I really think we don't have control of our borders, and it's been a very fertile formula for feeding this right-wing populism. These factors really haven't changed much, and I think continue to make us very vulnerable in Europe and in the United States.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

As Larry pointed out, there were certainly very concerning trends. If you look at the historical arc of the democracy scores -- V-Dem or Freedom House -- it is still going up. The decline in the last 510 years is really much within the margin of errors. That's not to say that we shouldn't be concerned about the decline of democracy, but we need to have a historical perspective in interpreting what has been going on in the last 10 years or so. There was some conversation about the meaning of the year 2022 in the earlier panel, and I'd like to think about the meaning of 2022 in terms of democracy in the world. Larry has already alluded to the relative rehabilitation of democracy in the US. Frankly, you have been following the confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism since the end of the Cold War with your book "The End of History". One of the biggest political event of 2022 was Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In the context of the history of democracy, especially in that region, how do you characterize the Ukrainian war and what happened after that, especially in terms of NATO's revival? It was dying, according to for example President Macron. However, it's expanding and going strong. Something really changed to consolidate the alliance of democracies.

What are your views on what happened in Ukraine, and where it is going, especially in terms of European democracies?

Dr. Francis Fukuyama

There are two implications of the Ukraine war.

This was not a war about territory between two countries. That was really just an interest to Russia, and Ukraine. It had a much broader significance for the parties involved, and it should have a significance to almost everybody else in the world who cares about world order and how geopolitics is structured. This goes back to the debate that Mike McFaul in the last session alluded to, over what caused the war in the first place.

There is a narrative out there that's pushed by people, especially those with a more realist bent like Henry Kissinger, who would say that the war was driven in a way by the United States or by NATO that wanted to expand NATO up to Russia's borders, deny at a buffer zone that would be constituted either by Eastern Europe or by Ukraine itself, and that the Russians acted defensively.

I think that this is wrong for quite a number of reasons. First of all, no one was really interested in expanding NATO although it was suggested that Ukraine and Georgia could join NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008. It was clear that nobody really wanted to let them in for obvious reasons. The real motive was one that Vladimir Putin articulated at great length in his very long 5000 word article written in the summer of 2021 explaining that basically the Russians and Ukrainians are one people, that the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the biggest historical mistakes, that all of these countries belong together under the same sovereignty. He repeated this

in a long speech he gave just before the war began a little bit less than a year ago. If you look at these different statements, it's very clear that what really bothers him is the whole postwar European settlement that emerged with the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991. He was demanding not just that Ukraine not enter NATO, but that all of the Eastern European members of NATO that had joined since the 1990s should also become neutral. In other words, what we used to call "Europe whole and free" with great pleasure because of the expansion of democracy was really what bothered Putin. It represented not a security threat but a political threat. If you could have an actual democracy flourish in a Slavic country that was part of the former Soviet Union, culturally very close to Russia, then why couldn't it flourish in Russia itself? There was a liberal opposition. I think that was really the threat. To the extent that that Putin was driven by insecurity, it was not military insecurity but rather political insecurity. His cure for that would be to undo the larger European settlement that had happened after 1991.

However, the second big issue that really affects everybody in the world is whether a country can use military force to change borders and acquire territory. There was a very strong norm established after the Second World War that modern countries or countries in general don't do this. By and large, there are some exceptions, like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and so forth. This was a norm that was broadly accepted. I remember the Kenyan representative, who was on the Security Council, at the time of the February invasion, gave this wonderful speech where he said, "look, we Kenyans come from different ethnic groups, our borders are completely drawn by colonial powers and they make no sense; but if every one of us, wanted to use military force to change those borders, we'd never be free of violence ever". I think that was a general view that everyone had, after 1945, that at least, you're not going to see big powers trying to take advantage of little powers in that exploitative way. I think that's really what hits this country. Up until the invasion of Ukraine, it was kind of plausible that these big powers are going to be prudent and think about their interests in this broader way.

All of a sudden, here's one big country trying to grab its neighbor. For everybody here, the possibility that was always present but nobody really believed, that China could grab Taiwan, suddenly became much more vivid, because you can see Russia trying to grab Ukraine. You could imagine Chinese troops landing on the beach in Taiwan and doing what the Russians were trying to do in Ukraine. That was the other big broad norm. That's part of the reason why it had the amazing effect here that it has in other parts of the world.

I would point out that there is a little bit of myopia among the democracies of the world in sort of thinking that they have. . So what also surprised people was the solidarity within the NATO alliance. I certainly wasn't expecting that. Your turn around in defense policy was prefigured by the Germans and its reversal for 40 years they had an 'AusPolitik' that saw reconciliation with Russia to be central. There was a lot of war guilt in a certain sense that Germany and World War Two had invaded Russia and they needed to have a good relationship. They had become pacifist. They were not going to be a military power. German young people were brought up under this assumption that never again would they fight another war. All of a sudden, in February, they declared, they're going to double their defense budget, and drop this eastern orientation in their foreign policy. All of this was really quite remarkable and in a way reassuring about the strength and solidarity among democracies, but we sometimes forget that there's a Global South out there. A lot of countries don't buy into this narrative.

There are several big disappointments, one of them is India. It gets to the question of whether the issue is really democracy versus authoritarian government. Prime Minister Modi has been eroding Indian democracy. Broadly speaking, India has been a pretty good democracy since its independence, and yet they don't take democracy at all seriously as a factor in their foreign policy: they buy weapons; they used to buy weapons from the former Soviet Union; they price their neutrality; they never wanted to line up with the West Country. South Africa, is a democracy. It transitioned to a democracy in the early 1990s, but it was mistreated by democracies, including by the United States, Britain, other Western democracies because of the colonial legacy. They just don't regard solidarity with other democracies as an important dimension of their foreign policy. It's a little bit of a mixed bag. I am very encouraged by the solidarity that has been shown, especially here and in Europe, but we have to remember that's not by any means the whole world.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

I want to come back and dig deeper into the issue of democracy versus authoritarianism, whether that's the appropriate framing or not. I know Larry feels passionate about Taiwan, so could you speak a little bit linking this session to the earlier session, On what it means to defend Taiwan in the context of democracy versus authoritarianism?

Dr. Larry Diamond

When I left at the end of 2021 as the coeditor of the *Journal of Democracy* after 32 years, I wrote an essay reflecting on the long arc of democratic change during that period and the challenges ahead. This was two months before Putin invaded Ukraine and Xi hasn't invaded Taiwan yet. What I think was obvious then was that these were the two frontline states for the battle for global democracy. I felt much of what would happen in the world, in terms of the future of democracy would involve "could they survive as democracies under pressure and threat from these two great power autocracies or not?". That question is unresolved in both of these frontline States as we sit here. As Frank has said many times, it is being tested on the battle grounds in Ukraine at horrific human cost.

Taiwan is a very vibrant democracy. There are three liberal democracies in East Asia: Japan, Taiwan and Korea. I think Taiwan is at least as democratic as any of them. It has a very vigorous civil society. A lot of innovation. Of course, it has deep divisions in the society, to a degree that I don't think Japan does, because of the division over Taiwan's identity and Taiwan's geopolitical future. There is wide agreement among comparative scholars of democracy that Taiwan is one of the great success stories of the third wave of global democratization. If Taiwan can just be wiped off the map - like Hitler wiped Czech democracy off the checklist, Slovakia democracy off the map, and essentially said in the late 1930s, had the rest of the world say "nice little democracy you had there, it's a pity it can't survive" the same way we have essentially said "nice little free society you had in Hong Kong, sorry it couldn't survive"- by the will and lust for power and domination of the most powerful authoritarian state in the world, what does that mean for the future of democracy and freedom? Now, I'm very worried about Taiwan because I think that there is going to be a PRC military invasion of Taiwan probably in this decade, unless it is deterred. The three most important actors in deterring it are Taiwan, the United States and Japan. That successful deterrence must involve coordination among all three, on strictly military terms on not only increased defense capacity but making sure that we buy the right kinds of weapons to counter a likely Chinese amphibious invasion, and to be prepared to impose such heavy costs on a Chinese invading force that she will say it's just not worth the risk. What else I can say is that democracy is about

uncertainty. There is a presidential election coming in January of 2024 in Taiwan. There is a battle going on for the soul of the KMT between an extreme, even anti-American, very accommodationist, Deep Blue camp (国民党、Kuomintang) and a more moderate, pragmatic faction of the camp that is more committed to defending the country. I would put in the chairman of the camp Eric Chu and the person who I think will be the KMT presidential candidate, the mayor of New Taipei, Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜), Vice President William Lai who alarms and angers Beijing because he's seen as Pro-independence more than Tsai Ing-wen, and has made a few statements that taken out of context can make it seem like he's another Chen Shui-bian who's going to try and inch Taiwan toward independence. I've met him and talked to him even fairly recently. I don't think he's going to do that, because he's smart enough to see how suicidal that would be. It's going to be another very important test.

China is going to intervene however it thinks it can in the Taiwan presidential election by trying to ensure that the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party, 民进党) loses, trying to manipulate the information environment. Taiwan spends an enormous amount of money just trying to track united front agents in Taiwan. Chinese Communist Party influence agents and trying to counter Chinese Communist Party disinformation. If you're Xi Jinping, you'd rather pick up Taiwan peacefully even by force. If you could get a sympathetic government in there, that would start negotiating, then you're on a different track. Over time, you just kind of ratchet up the pressure more, and so on. That's definitely a preferable course. There's a lot of uncertainty here. And I think it's going to be very important that the people of Taiwan see that they're not alone. The democracies of the world, not just the United States and Japan, but Australia and Europe, are with them. It will increase the will to fight.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Wonderful. Going back to democracy versus authoritarianism, as a social scientist, I am tempted to talk more about whether it is analytically accurate to divide all the politics in the world into two camps. One is democracy, the other is authoritarian or autocratic regimes. Today, there seems to be a lot of hybrids models. People use labels like "authoritarian democracy", "illiberal democracy", "democratic authoritarianism". There are all kinds of different labels for these hybrid versions of politics. Perhaps, the more policy relevant issue is whether it is strategically wise to divide the world into two camps, as the United States seemed to be doing in calling Democracy Summit last year. If you observe all these countries, especially Southeast Asian countries, African countries, we, in the West, would like to have those countries on our side. To win their hearts and minds, it may not be the most effective approach to just preach them democracy or thought about free voting, because they need more economic resources and need to put food on the table. In approaching those countries, I am not entirely sure whether the framing of democracy versus autocracy is the best approach. I'm wondering how you feel about that, and what might be the best strategy in really winning the battle. China seems to be doing quite well, at least until Sri Lanka, Pakistan and so on. In making entry into those countries, or at least at the government rulers level. In winning the global South, which will be an important battleground for us, what will be the best approach?

Dr. Francis Fukuyama

I think we need to make some definitions because there's a lot of confusion in terms. When Americans use the term democracy, first of all, they usually mean liberal democracy. And liberal

democracy actually consists of two separate sets of institutions that oftentimes go together but are conceptually and practically separate.

The liberal part of liberal democracy really has to do with a presumption of the juridical equality of all human beings, the existence of individual rights that those citizens have, and the need to protect those rights through rule of law by means of constitutional checks and balances that prevent an excessive concentration of power.

The democratic principle really has to do with popular sovereignty and the idea that governments should be accountable to as large a portion of the population as possible. Institutionally, that's represented through multiparty, free and fair elections.

Different parts of the world are more aligned with the liberal part, and some are more aligned with the democratic part. It's striking that Asians tend to like the liberal part more than the democratic part.

For example, in this part of the world, we want a rule based international order. That's not saying we want people to be able to vote for their leaders and so forth. What that means is basically what we want a liberal order that establishes rules, limitations on the way that economic actors behave, that makes them predictable.

Therefore, a country like China that has no elections can participate in a rule-based order. In this country, that's really the kind of underlying principle of what is the Free and Open Indo Pacific. It's a liberal order, much more than it is a democratic order. You're not going to appeal to Laos, or Cambodia, or even a democracy like Indonesia, primarily by appealing to the democratic part. You are going to appeal to them by stressing the liberal part.

In Europe, It's actually a little bit the reverse, that democracy is really the source of legitimacy. What happened with the rise of populist regimes like Orban's Hungary is that you get democratically elected leaders. It was democratic in terms of the will of the people. It was not a liberal election that happened according to strict procedural rules. There's no question that he got a big majority of the vote in Hungary, and then he used that power to undermine the liberal part of liberal democracy. This is also what Modi has done. Modi has been very popular in India, and he's been eroding the liberal part of liberal democracy.

the populist movements in Western countries have largely been democratically legitimated, but 'they're not liberal, including Donald Trump.

Donald Trump, by our rules did win the 2016 election, but he wants to use the Attorney General to go after his enemies. He doesn't want to follow the rules when he loses an election and so forth. There's a slightly different dynamic where the democratic part conveys more legitimacy than the liberal part.

One further observation is just a kind of self-reflection about Americans. American national identity has been connected to the idea of both liberalism and democracy, much more deeply than virtually any other country in the world.

Think about Japan or Italy, or Sweden, these were all countries way before they were democracies. They've got their own cultures, food history, that way preceded the rise of democracy.

Japan was briefly a democracy in the Taisho period, but after the late 1940s, when people in this country think about what Japan is about. The first thing is not democracy. It's really a whole bunch of other cultural inheritances.

That's just not true for Americans, because we're an incredibly diverse, ethnically, racially, religiously. We used to be much less pluralistic. Even from the beginning, there was a big racial division in the United States, and therefore, you couldn't base American identity so easily over time on race, religion, inherited culture, because we basically didn't have an inherited culture and all came from other places. Therefore, liberal democracy becomes the source of American identity.

I do think that Americans sometimes have a problem in not realizing that not everybody in the world is like that. Democracy means something very deeply to many people around the world, as does liberalism, again in different proportions in different countries. As a unifying principle, it works in some places, and we should take advantage of it. In other parts of the world, that might not be the thing that you want to lead with. It may be economic growth, and certainly for many developing countries. In a way, that's kind of an argument for stressing the liberal rather than the democratic part, because in general, liberal regimes have been better at promoting growth than the democratic ones.

Dr. Larry Diamond

I want to make a couple of additional points as you've already heard one dissenting point. The most important additional point is it's not a Democracy Summit. It's a Summit for Democracy. I was never that crazy about the initiative to tell you the truth. When I look at how much of person power and intellectual energy that the Biden administration has devoted to the future of democracy in the world, what a high percentage of that has been absorbed in just the planning for and agonizing internal debates over the Summit for Democracy, and I'm not sure it was really worth it.

In any case, the framing was very valuable, because it sought to at least partially avoid -- maybe not adequately -- the Cold War style division of the world into "our side and their side". We've seen in the UN votes on Ukraine and a number of other things. The Indonesia's Non-Aligned movement, it's kind of backed in a way. They're just not going to sign up to an initiative in which they have to line up behind the United States, as pro-democracy against China, Russia, and so on.

That leads to my second point, which may get into whatever questions you have about what is to be done.

I think we really need to fight for values, democratic, and to the extent we can, liberal values. But I understand there's cultural differences in the world. Our public diplomacy efforts have kind of lapsed in the United States.

We still don't have a permanent Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. It's really shocking. We're not spending the amount of money in real terms on public diplomacy, which is everything from broadcasting to support for other international media and getting our story out and fighting

for our values and international forms and so on, that we have had a decade ago when the challenge wasn't nearly as severe as it is now in the age of disinformation.

There has to be an element of pragmatism, a long-range view, trying to win a longer-term battle for what people think and believe, and a very vigorous battle to counter disinformation.

Now, let me say why I think Hungary is not a democracy, because I think it's very important to understand this, particularly now in the world we are in. It's not enough for a government that emerges out of contested elections to have apparent majority support or even broad majority support. They had elections, more people in the country favor that party than any other country. So it must be a democracy. If that were true, we would call Singapore democracy. And nobody is really calling Singapore a democracy. You've got to have at least a reasonably level playing field, which of course does not exist. I can't be perfect. It never is perfect. It's probably not even perfect in Norway, but you have to have a reasonably level playing field in order for competitive multiparty elections to meet a decent standard of democracy. There's a fair amount of consensus among comparative scholars of democracy on this point. If you look at what Viktor Orban has done to gerrymander electoral districts, to crush independent media, to silence independent universities, to threaten intellectuals, dominate the information space, if he then wins as he did the last parliamentary election, and even gets a majority of votes, as a result of that, you still don't know what the electoral outcome would have been if it were a level playing field. If there were a level playing field, I can tell you absolutely no one has any doubt that, for now, the PAP would still be ruling in Singapore. We'd have a lot more fewer seats than it has now. There actually was an election where Viktor Orban got fewer votes than the opposition combined. He won a two thirds majority of Parliament because he had gerrymandered the districts so much.

I say all this, not just because I think Orban is a particularly ominous danger to democracy globally, because he's become a rallying point against liberalism and for the enemies of democracy in the United States and Europe, but also because the demise of democracy is happening incrementally, and often silently, step by step in a number of countries in the world. If we don't recognize this process of somewhat silent decay, and the growing climate of fear, and the unwillingness of businesses any longer to contribute to the opposition, because the tax man will be out their door and all the other things we could talk about, then, we don't understand what's happening in terms of how democracies dying around the world.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

We are probably not going to settle whether Hungary is a democracy or not right here, but I want to cover two important points that a lot of people in Japan are likely to be interested in. One is where American democracy is going? And two is what does this all mean for the Japanese public? Larry talked a little bit about what ails American democracy and some of the solutions. Do you have some more to add, gerrymandering is actually a factor in the US as well. You have some suggestions in your book about ranking order voting than other options.

On liberalism, Frank have an entire new book on liberalism that is going to be translated into Japanese version. In the book, you laid out some problems: excesses of liberalism in the US both in the right and left. Could you speak to that issue a little bit more and talk about how that might shape the future of American democracy in the coming years? Maybe start with Larry, if you have things to add about American democracy.

Dr. Larry Diamond

First, the positive. I do think there are signs that we've entered an era of political reform in the United States. I do think our best prospect for depolarizing our politics is by adopting the electoral system that Australia has for their lower house, of the preferential vote, the instant runoff, what we call in the United States "ranked-choice voting". Also eliminating partisan primaries so that you have one blanket primary. The field is narrowed down to a few candidates, typically four or five. This instant runoff is used to choose a majority winner among those four or five. I think the system would be much more likely to choose a less polarizing victor in a lot of kind of contested outcomes. There's some momentum gathering for that. It was adopted in Maine in 2018. In different forms, this instant runoff preferential vote was adopted in Maine in 2018, Alaska in 2020, in Nevada this past November. It's going to be possible on the ballot in Oregon in 2024, and the state of Minnesota is going to adopt it legislatively this year. A lot of American States have been adopting other reforms that I'd say are good reforms for democracy to increase the number of people who are registered to vote by making voter registration, a more automatic process by restoring the right to vote to convicted felons, because in the United States, the racial distribution of people convicted of criminal felony crimes is vastly disproportionate to African Americans and to some extent Latinos.

On the other hand, what worries me is that even though I think Trump is a unique threat to American democracy, and it looks like his stock is falling. (cough) I guess that cough medicine didn't work so well. Even though that's the case, I think that, um, I don't say this as a partisan statement. I mean, I work at it. I also work at a conservative think tank, the Hoover Institution, but I think there are a lot of Republicans whose commitment to democracy is questionable at best. There's a lot of anti-democratic sentiment among the MAGA base of the Republican Party.

Dr. Francis Fukuyama

There's been problems with liberalism in the United States that had been pushed both by the right and the left. The right-wing misinterpretation of liberalism is what we call Neoliberalism, which was a set of economic policies that worshiped the market and tried to remove the state from regulation from state ownership, or encouragement of economic activity that really begins with Thatcher and Reagan. We're kind of at the end of that period that produced a lot of economic inequality. On the left, you've had this transformation of the left in many countries, but particularly in the United States and Europe, from parties that were based on class, meaning, the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie, poor people versus rich people, to one based on much narrower identities that had to do with race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and the like.

In the process of that transition, it became, in the hands of certain progressive advocates, illiberal. Intolerant of people that didn't share that same social justice, attitude towards these kinds of issues.

That in turn provoked a big reaction on the right, what drives most Republicans these days: it used to be low taxes, right, and government regulation, but in recent years, it's all been these cultural things that like they don't like critical race theory, or they don't like transgender activists and this sort of thing.

The nature of the politics has shifted in many ways to these kinds of cultural issues. I think that's what's screwing up American politics, quite frankly, right now. The right-wing part is being adjusted.

I think that neoliberalism has been out for at least 10 years now. The state is kind of much more prominent in terms of industrial policy, protecting semiconductor, supply chains, and so forth. The progressive distortion of liberalism is a little bit more complicated because that's deeply embedded in civil rights and our view of individual rights. That continues to roil our politics.

I wish I could offer you a simple solution of how to pull back from that, but I'm not sure I can.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

I just want to quickly ask about what can Japan do to contribute to upholding the international liberal order and democracies. While domestic democracy as Larry alluded to seems to be functioning reasonably well compared to other democracies in Europe and the United States, Japan is dependent on international trade. Japan needs international exchanges of people, goods, resources, ideas continue.

Japan is surrounded by authoritarian countries that have seemed to have strong appetite for more territories, resources, and have powerful military such as China, Russia, North Korea, and so on. It seems obvious that Japan needs to contribute to defending of the international liberal order. In that regard, what advice do you have? What can Japan do more to make contributions in this regard?

Dr. Francis Fukuyama

Japan has already done the right things, at least in initiating... so when United States pulled out of the TPP, Japan took leadership and trying to revive the TPP and keep the idea going, as best it could, despite the fact that it lost its biggest original backer (the United States), and that was very helpful. Now in the security realm, the planned increases in the defense budget are exactly what is called for to meet this new set of security threats that are very vivid and overtly military. It'll be a question about follow through as Oriana was saying. That's a challenge. that really all of us have, so I think Japan has done a pretty good job in all of this.

Dr. Larry Diamond

I don't know enough about Japanese domestic politics to offer any advice to this audience, but I would like to offer this observation. I don't think it's quite right to say that Japan is surrounded by authoritarian regimes. You want to know a country that's surrounded by authoritarian regimes. Mongolia, whose only two borders are with Russia and China, how would you like to be Mongolia today? Japan does face this extremely dangerous arc of Russia, North Korea, and obviously, especially China. It will be much more accurate to say that Japan is surrounded by authoritarian regimes if China conquers Taiwan. I'll just make this prediction. They're not going to stop there. Sooner or later, they're going to take the Senkaku Islands as well.

And I keep saying I think I heard Frank say it on this trip, too. We've entered a kind of 1930s moment in this region, where the overriding challenge is to deter and if necessary to defeat authoritarian aggression before the authoritarian regimes ban on aggression, but particularly China become so powerful that it will be hard to stop them. Part of the tragedy of Europe agreeing to the Munich Pact that it essentially signed away Czechoslovakia and before that just kind of shrugging

their shoulders when Hitler simply completely overran Germany's commitments for a demilitarized Rhineland and moved his military forces right there near the French border, is that Europe could have prevailed at much lower cost early on.

With each failure to act, the stakes became greater, and the chances of success became lower. So even if all China does is take Taiwan, what's it going to mean for Japan's ability to defend its territory? I'm not going to name any names, but I have been struck. It's the single most important thing I've been struck by that several members of the kind of political realm in Japan, who have held or hold elective office, have privately said to us that they consider Taiwan... They consider ensuring that China does not forcibly take over Taiwan to be an existential issue for Japan. I think now making that clear to the Japanese people, and to Beijing, has become a pretty important imperative for Japanese democracy.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Thank you. Hosoya-san has a question.

Yuichi Hosoya

I'd like to ask you about the biggest concern or worry about the Japanese democracy or Japanese geopolitical position today here. Maybe there are some points that we cannot see in Japan, and maybe you can see from the United States. Japan is another frontline state, together with Taiwan as well as Ukraine. Therefore, we need to be aware of some of the problems, concerns or shortcomings that we have in Japanese democracy or Japan's geopolitical position. I'd like to know your wisdom about that.

Dr. Larry Diamond

I don't know enough about Japan and its domestic politics to give a very informed and even semi-confident answer to your question, but the most obvious thing that can be said is that... And this is not criticism of the LDP, some of the people we've met have been people who hold prominent positions in the party. And I must say, maybe I had a bias sound sample, but I found them to be very impressive individuals. This is not a criticism of the LDP. But you know, whenever you have, it's the most obvious thing that's been said about Japan over Japanese democracy over the decades. Whenever you have one political party largely dominating for seven years or so it's an area in which maybe one would want to cast some attention. I think simply achieving more responsible and effective parties beyond the LDP is one obvious area. The second thing, with all humility, I think many liberal democracies really struggle with the problem of money in politics. I think that Japan and the United States struggled with it, to some extent, in different ways. In the United States, our Supreme Court has, to my mind, outrageously misinterpreted the First Amendment to get congressional ability to regulate a lot of campaign spending that's independent of candidates. I'm sure the problem manifests itself in different ways in Japan.

But I'd say reforms to somehow mitigate the influence of money in politics and to ensure absolute transparency and an all flows of money into politics, that would be a second thing.

Dr. Francis Fukuyama

I'm not quite sure whether this is the right place or time to say this. But in many ways, I think one of the biggest social problems that Japan faces is the one that former Prime Minister Abe identified,

your female labor force participation rate is way too low. Compared to other developed democracies. I mean, this is a subject for much longer conversation, but I actually think that that's also related to the extremely low fertility rate in Japan. When you have a highly educated, fairly rich society, with a lot of educated women, and you have that kind of socially conservative society, one of the responses of women is not to want to have a lot of children. This is not just in Japan, I think this is also the case in Korea and Singapore, many other Asian countries. That kind of social transformation needs to happen just for pure economic reasons, because you're underutilizing a really major part of your workforce. The low fertility has been recognized as a big vulnerability in Japan, but it's related to these other things as well. As an outsider, that would be my observation.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Takenaka-san has a quick question.

Harukata Takenaka

On rise of authoritarianism -- If you look at the situation in East Asia, those countries located in the Indochina Peninsula tend to be authoritarian, whereas island countries except South Korea and Mongolia tend to be democratic, such as Japan, Indonesia, Philippines and Taiwan. If you look at GDP per capita, that of Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand are higher than that of Philippines or Indonesia. What do you think makes it very hard for the Southeast Asian countries on the Indochina Peninsula to democratize or sustain their regimes?

Dr. Larry Diamond

These alignments kind of change over time. In 1985, you would not have been able to say that maritime Southeast Asia is democratic. Not Indonesia, not the Philippines.

Thailand is a very puzzling country to me right now. I don't think it's got anything to do with Thailand being on the kind of Peninsula landmass, or periphery, or of China. Obviously, the Chinese shadow was there. It's an influence. When Thaksin Shinawatra rose up in the late 1990s, and then became prime minister, he really scared the devil out of the Thai elite and the Thai military. It's important that we not glorify him. He was not a democrat, in my view, but he was winning elections by mobilizing democratic electoral support. I don't think Thailand ever really recovered from the military coup that displaced him. That deep social cleavage, between the countryside and the urban elite, or partly a class cleavage, partly an identity cleavage, just hung like a dark cloud over Thailand ever since. It's not been able to get back and the military doesn't particularly want to give up power. I guess if I said this in Thailand, I could be prosecuted for lese-majeste, since I am going there soon, I better be careful. But I think the role of the monarchy recently has not been as at times pro democratic, as it was at strategic moments earlier in Thailand. It's a lot of esoteric reasons.

We now have Anwar Ibrahim as the new Prime Minister of Malaysia, I don't want to glorify him as well, but you now have in Malaysia the most democratic kind of philosophically-committed-to-democracy individual who's ever led government in Malaysia. They had one false start after UMNO lost that landmark election, but Malaysia could actually emerge as a democracy.

There's a lot of fluidity, uncertainty and possibilities in a lot of these countries.

I don't know what to call the Philippines. It's probably in electoral democracy, but a very low-quality. Indonesia, you know, I think it's pretty impressive that it's been able to survive as a democracy. It's got a lot of problems and challenges. What strikes me is that a lot of these countries in Southeast Asia, obviously, in the near term that doesn't include Vietnam and Cambodia, a lot of these countries could go in either direction.

One last thing that has been stirring in my mind for a long time is that if Vietnam were a stock, I would buy it as a long-term investment, because I think it's going to be a democracy before China is.

Dr. Kiyoteru Tsutsui

Well on that positive note. I'm afraid we are running out of time. So I apologize to those of you whose questions we couldn't integrate. Please join me in thanking our wonderful panelists for their insights.

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