Japan’s National Security Strategy (2022)

### National Security Challenges

**Global**
- Power Balance
- Challenges to the Status-Quo
- New domains
- Economic Security
- Lost of Strong Leadership

**Indo-Pacific**
- China: Greatest strategic challenge
- DPRK: Grave and imminent threat
- Russia: Strong security concern

Gravity in Indo-Pacific> Transform the nature of the international community
- Russian invasion in Ukraine> Shakes the very foundation of international order
- Cyber, maritime, space, and electromagnetic domains
- Supply-chain vulnerability, threats to critical infrastructures, tech-competition are now too many to rally together in taking on common challenges

### Japan’s National Interests, Principles, Security Objectives

**Japan’s National Interests**
1. Maintain sovereignty and independence
2. National prosperity, economic growth, co-prosperity
3. Universal values, international order based on international law
   - Free and open Indo-Pacific region

**Fundamental Principles**
1. Proactive contribution to peace
2. Uphold universal values
3. Maintaining exclusively defense-oriented policy
4. U.S-Japan alliance as the cornerstone
5. Cooperation with like-minded countries

**National Security Objectives**
1. Protecting sovereignty and independence
2. Deter contingencies and attempts to change the status quo
3. Achieve a new balance of power in the Indo-Pacific
4. Multilateral cooperation for co-prosperity

### Japan’s Strategic Approaches

Harnessing Comprehensive National Power (diplomacy, defense, economy, technology, intelligence)

**Diplomacy** (Crisis Prevention, Peaceful&Stable Int’l Environment, Free&Open Int’l Order)
1. Strengthening the US-Japan Alliance
2. Maintain and develop a free/open rules-based international order
3. Diplomacy with neighboring countries, including territorial issues
4. Arms control, disarmament & non-proliferation
5. International counter-terrorism
6. Climate change measures
7. Strategic use of ODA and int’l cooperation
8. Promotion of people-to-people exchanges

**Defense Architecture**
1. Fundamentally reinforcing defense capabilities
   - Cross-domain operation
   - Improving mobility, hardening facilities
   - Stand-off defense/counterstrike capabilities
   - Defense budget: 2% of current GDP by FY2027
2. Comprehensive defense architecture
3. Defense production and technology base
4. Transfer of defense equipment and technology
5. Solidify the human resource base for SDF Personnel

**Japan-U.S. Alliance**
- Strengthen the deterrence and response capability, including full-range capability of the extended deterrence.

**All Directional Defense**
1. Cyber Security
2. Maritime security
3. Space Security
4. PPP and R&D for Technology
5. Intelligence
6. Public infrastructures
7. Civil Defense
8. Safety of overseas nationals
9. Energy and Food Security

**Economic Security Policies**
- Enhance self-reliance, advantage, and indispensability
  1. Economic Security Promotion Act
  2. Supply chain resilience
  3. Reviewing government procurement procedures
  4. Data and information protection (incl. security clearance)

**International Economic Order**
- Preventing non-military pressure
- Sustainable and inclusive economic growth + free and fair economic order through WTO / CPTPP / RCEP / IPEF

**Global Efforts for Coexistence and Coprosperity**
- Multilateral Organizations / Pandemics / Humanitarian Efforts
Fundamental Reinforcement of Japan’s Defense Capabilities
- Japan should be able to take primary responsibility for disrupting and defeating an invasion of Japan.
- Japan’s capability makes the goal of the invasion of Japan not achievable through military means; damage of opponent incurs will not make the invasion worth the cost (deterrence by denial)
- Japan’s capability coupled with the U.S. will also be able to enhance deterrence in Indo-Pacific.

Disrupt and defeat invasion over long distances, thereby deterring invasion
- Standoff Defense
- Integrated Air & Missile Defense
- Unmanned defense capabilities
- Cross-domain operation capabilities
- Command and Control intelligence functions
- Conduct swift and persistent operations to dissuade direct conflict
- Mobile deployment capability
- Sustainability/resiliency

Counterstrike: Capabilities*

Military Trends Surrounding Japan
China
- Increasing defense budget / Improved capabilities
- Increased military activities / Taiwan
- Serious concern + greatest strategic challenge

DPRK
- WMD / enhanced missile capabilities
- Even more grave and imminent threat

Russia
- Increased activity/strategy coordination with China
- Strong concern from a defense perspective

Three Objectives
1. Shape a security environment not accepting unilateral changes to the status quo by force. Respond in any way and control the at an early stage to prevent further escalation into an invasion.
2. If deterrence fail, rapidly respond seamlessly; disrupt and defeat the invasion holding our primary responsibility and support from its ally.
3. U.S. extended deterrence, with nuclear deterrence at its core, is essential

Three Approaches
1. Strengthen Japan’s own architecture for national defense
   - Fundamentally reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities
   - Reinforce the defense architecture of the whole country
2. Further reinforce joint deterrence and response capability of the Japan-U.S. Alliance.
3. Reinforce collaboration with like-minded countries

Japan’s Basic Defense Policy
- Japan’s future defense capability will focus on such opponent’s capabilities, and way of warfare and will be fundamentally reinforced to defend itself more than ever.
- Japan will promote its response to the new way of warfare and must make clear its intention to never accept unilateral changes to the status quo by force and such attempts at any time.

Defense Challenges
- Ballistic and cruise missiles with enhanced precision strike capabilities
- Hybrid warfare, including information warfare
- Asymmetric attacks leveraging space/cyber/electromagnetic/Unmanned assets
- Threat of use of nuclear weapons

Three Years
2027
- Japan to take primary responsibility for disrupting and defeating aggression
  - Advanced standoff missile/Wide-area air defense capabilities
  - Enhanced efficiency in countering UAVs
  - Enhanced ability to simultaneously control unmanned assets
  - Space operation capabilities/cyber security support beyond SDF Land, sea, and air capabilities linked with unmanned systems AI and intelligence/strong defense production base

2022
- Maximize the Performance of Existing Equipment
  - Improve operational tempo/missions and fuel/investments in defense facilities for improved resiliency
  - Reinforce the Core Capability for the Future

2032
- Standoff missiles/counter-hypersonic weapons and UAVs
- Enhanced missile defense / Space Domain Awareness
- Cyber Security/Electromagnetic warfare
  - Japan’s National Defense
  - ASD, ASW, ISRT

Joint Deterrence and Response by the Japan-U.S. Alliance
- Alliance with the United States is the cornerstone of Japan’s security policy.
- By representing joint resolve and capabilities, Japan and the U.S. will prevent the escalation of emergencies from gray-zone situations to an invasion with conventional force and the use of nuclear weapons > modernize and strengthen joint capabilities
- Strengthening Japan-U.S. joint deterrence and response capabilities: roles, missions and capabilities and further reinforce deterrence capabilities/combined cross-domain operations / air-defense, ASD, ASW, ISRT

Collaborations with Like-minded Countries
- Australia: “Special Strategic Partnership” / closest cooperation next to U.S.
- India: “Special Strategic and Global Partnership” / maritime security and cybersecurity
- UK, France, Germany, Italy: Global security issues/challenges in Europe and Indo-Pacific
- NATO/EU: Formulation of international rules and involvement in the Indo-Pacific
- ROK: DPRK nuclear and missile threats/Japan-US-ROK cooperation / trilateral exercises
- ASEAN: Support centrality of ASEAN/EAS/ARF, ADMM-Plus / capacity building

Strategic Environment and Defense Challenges

Strategic Environment
1. Non-like-minded states becoming more influential
2. Russian invasion of Ukraine→New era of crisis
3. Shifting power balance in the Indo-Pacific
4. Intensified US-Sino competition (next 10 years will be the decisive decade for the competition with China)
5. Technological advancements→Requires new approaches to security
6. Cyber/Information warfare/climate change

Military Trends Surrounding Japan

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Japan’s National Defense Strategy (2022)
Japan’s Counter-Strike Capability

A key to deterring invasion against Japan is counterstrike capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In recent years, in Japan’s surroundings, there have been dramatic advances in missile-related technologies, including hypersonic weapons, and practical skills for missile operations, such as saturation attack. Missile forces in the region have significantly improved in both qualitative and quantitative terms, and missiles themselves have been repeatedly launched. Missile attacks against Japan have become a palpable threat. Under these circumstances, Japan will continue its steadfast efforts to both qualitatively and quantitatively enhance its missile defense capabilities by continuing to develop technologies that bring the ability to deal with missiles with irregular trajectories.

Looking ahead, however, if Japan continues to rely solely upon ballistic missile defenses, it will become increasingly difficult to fully address missile threats with the existing missile defense network alone.

For this reason, Japan needs counterstrike capabilities: capabilities which, in the case of missile attacks by an opponent, enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent to prevent further attacks while defending against incoming missiles by means of the missile defense network.

Counterstrike capabilities are SDF’s capabilities that leverage stand-off defense capability and other capabilities. In cases where armed attack against Japan has occurred, and as part of that attack ballistic missiles and other means have been used, counterstrike capabilities enable Japan to mount effective counterstrikes against the opponent’s territory. Counterstrikes are done as a minimum necessary measure for self-defense and in accordance with the Three New Conditions for Use of Force.

By possessing such capabilities to mount effective counterstrikes, Japan will deter armed attack itself. If an opponent ever launches missiles, it will be able to prevent the opponent’s further armed attacks by counterstrike capabilities, while protecting itself against incoming missiles by the missile defense network, thereby defending the lives and peaceful livelihoods of Japanese nationals.

Counterstrike capabilities are the capabilities on which the Government expressed its view on February 29, 1956, which stated that, under the Constitution, “as long as it is deemed that there are no other means to defend against attack by guided missiles and others, to hit the bases of those guided missiles and others is legally within the purview of self-defense and thus permissible.” These are also capabilities that the Government has chosen not to acquire up to now as a matter of policy decision.

This Government view squarely applies to measures for self-defense taken under the Three New Conditions for Use of Force, presented in the 2015 Legislation for Peace and Security, and the capabilities that Japan has now decided to acquire can be used when the above-mentioned Three Conditions are met in compliance with this view.

Counterstrike capabilities fall within the purview of Japan’s Constitution and international law; they do not change Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented policy; and, they will be used only when the above-mentioned Three New Conditions are fulfilled. Needless to say, preemptive strikes, namely striking first at a stage when no armed attack has occurred, remain impermissible.

While the basic division of roles between Japan and the United States will remain unchanged, as Japan will now possess counterstrike capabilities, the two nations will cooperate in counterstrikes.